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Abstract
eHealth is a relatively recent term that is frequently used to refer to
healthcare services making an extensive use of technology and telecom-
munications systems. Some examples of eHealth systems can be the
electronic health record that allow different healthcare professionals
to access to patient data at the same time and from different loca-
tions; the ePrescribing in which the entire process of management and
control of prescriptions among patients, doctors and pharmacists is
digitized, or; the Telemedicine that enables the possibility of moni-
toring, making diagnosis and treatment remotely to patients. eHealth
can be considered as a particular case of the Internet of Things (IoT),
where “things” are essentially sensors which are constantly gathering
data about the medical condition of a subject. These sensors provide a
smarter approach to health services making the decision-making pro-
cess more accurate and effective due to the fact that patients do not
need to be physically on medical centers.
It has been thought that Implantable Medical Device (IMD) such as
pacemakers, insulin pumps or cochlear implants were the only de-
vices in charge of measuring biological information. However, there
are many other gadgets which can be placed on or around the hu-
man body such as smartphones, wristbands or even the smartwatches
that can also be used to sense some vital signs of the bearer with-
out interfering in her life. These devices are known as wearables and
are basically smart electronic devices with different sensors inside like
accelerometer, electrocardiogram, electromyograph, electroencephalo-
gram, electrodermograph, GPS, oximeter, bluetooth proximity, pres-
sure or thermometer that can help to extract biological information
from the person wearing them.
When these sensors are placed in the same body and can share infor-
mation, it is said to be part of a Body Area Network (BAN), also
known as Body Sensor Network (BSN) or Medical Body Network
(MBAN). The first use of the BAN was in the continuous monitor
healthcare domain, especially for patients who need continuous mon-
itoring, e.g., patients suffering from chronic diseases such diabetes,
asthma or heart attacks. Nowadays, we can find other applications
to improve the performance in sports, for military purposes, or as
authentication mechanisms.
When BANs are provided with connectivity, it is said to be a Wireless
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Body Area Network (WBAN). These kind of networks usually have
a central device (also known as hub, commonly implemented by a
smartphone) with Internet connectivity. Due to this connectivity, the
gathered information can also be shared not only with other devices in
the same network but also be sent to public servers in order to be fully
accessible by different people such as medical staff, the user’s personal
trainer or just for private purposes.
Information gathered by a WBAN usually contains high sensitive due
to the nature of the data. Therefore, the security and privacy on these
networks have been identified as two of the most challenging tasks by
research community. New cryptographic protocols are needed not only
to protect the user’s identity but also to protect the integrity of the
patient’s medical data.
Biometric plays an important role because it refers to identification
and authentication methods by which, using biological signals, can
identify or validate the identity of a person. In the last years, several
works have been published on biometric authentication and identifica-
tion. This kind of authentication systems have great potential because
each biological trait must be universal, collectable, unobtrusive, per-
manent, unique and difficult to circumvent. From a technical point of
view, biometrics can be classified into two main groups depending on
whether the deployed system uses physiological or behavioral signals.
Examples of physiological signals include fingerprint, iris, retina, heart
and brain signals. On the contrary, examples of behavioral systems
are voice, signature analysis or keystroke dynamics. The main reason
why such signals can be easily included in authentication systems is
because they exhibit a most if not all of the aforementioned features.
Interest in biometrics has gained momentum in the last years mostly
due to the massive use of daily life devices like smartwatches, smart-
phones and laptops. This interest is not temporary, the global biomet-
ric market revenues will reach $34.6 billion annually in 2020, especially
in mobile devices.
In the last years, a new way of generating and distributing secret to-
kens based on the heart signal has gained more and more popularity
among security researchers. It can be seen how since the first paper
appeared in 2004, proposing that the heart signal might be applied to
cryptography, several proposals have been published in the literature.
Particularly, the use of heart signal has gained a special attraction
in cryptographic application as a random number generator. Such
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random tokens can be used to generate a private key, as part of an au-
thentication protocol, as an alternative to classical key establishment
protocols or can be used on proximity detection protocols among oth-
ers.
Heart signal contains six different peaks, known by the letters P, Q,
R, S, T and U. The fiducial points are used to describe the points of
interest which can be extracted from biological signal. Some examples
of fiducials points of the Electrocardiogram (ECG) are P-wave, QRS
complex, T-wave, R peaks or the RR-time-interval (the time distance
between two consecutive R-peaks) also known as Inter-Pulse Interval
(IPI) in the literature. Heart signal is a continuous signal that is
gathered by some sensors, and it is transformed into a discrete signal.
This process is known as quantization. While the first algorithm was
introduced by Bao et al. [18] many authors have used quantization
algorithms to extract different fiducial points from each Inter-Pulse
Interval (IPI) due to its claimed entropy property.
The majority of the proposed works in this area conclude that the
last 4-bits of each IPI can be used as a random number because of
their high entropy. In a vast majority of the literature, authors rely
either directly or indirectly—by referencing other papers, on the fact
that the heart signal contains entropy and thus, it might be used
in key generation procedures, authentication protocols or peak miss-
detection algorithms. As an example, if an authentication protocol
requires a 128 bit key to work, it would be necessary to acquire 32 IPIs
(i.e., at least 33 consecutive R-peaks). Considering that a regular heart
beats at 50-100 Bits per Minute (bpm), the key generation process
would take between 20 and 40 seconds. Depending on the system
where this protocol is deployed might be feasible.
Most of the proposed solutions in the literature rely on some question-
able assumptions. For instance, it is commonly assumed that it possi-
ble to generate the same cryptographic token in at least two different
devices that are sensing the same signal using the IPI of each cardiac
signal without applying any synchronization algorithm; authors typi-
cally only measure the entropy of the Least Significant Bit (LSB) to
determine whether the generated cryptographic values are random or
not; authors usually pick the four LSBs assuming they are the best
ones to create the best cryptographic tokens; the datasets used in these
works are rather small and, therefore, possibly not significant enough,
or; in general it is impossible to reproduce the experiments carried out
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by other researchers because the source code of such experiments is
not usually available.
In this Thesis, we overcome these weaknesses trying to systematically
address most of the open research questions. That is why, in all the
experiments carried out during this research we used a public database
called PhysioNet which is available on Internet and stores a huge heart
database named PhysioBank. This repository is constantly updated
by medical researchers who share the sensitive information about pa-
tients and it also offers an open source software named PhysioToolkit
which can be used to read and display these signals. All datasets that
we used contain ECG records obtained from a variety of real subjects
with different heart-related pathologies as well as healthy people.
The first chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 1) is entirely dedicated
to present the research questions, introduce the main concepts used
all along this document as well as settle down some medical and cryp-
tographic definitions. Finally, the objectives that this dissertation
tackles down are described together with the main motivations for
this Thesis.
In Chapter 2 we report the results of a large-scale statistical study
to determine if heart signal is a good source of entropy. For this,
we analyze 19 public datasets of heart signals from the Physionet
repository, spanning electrocardiograms from multiple subjects sam-
pled at different frequencies and lengths. We then apply both ENT
and National Institute of Standard and Technology Statistical Test
Suite (NIST STS) standard battery of randomness tests to the ex-
tracted IPIs. In particular, ENT is a suite composed of the following
tests: entropy, Chi-Square, arithmetic mean, Monte Carlo, and se-
rial correlation coefficient statistical tests. As output, ENT reports
the overall randomness results after running the aforementioned tests.
On the contrary, NIST STS is a suite made of fifteen statistical tests:
frequency monobit and block tests, runs, longest run of ones in a block,
binary matrix rank, discrete Fourier Transform (spectral) test, over-
lapping and non-overlapping template matching, Maurer’s Universal
Statistical tests, linear complexity, serial, approximate entropy, cumu-
lative sums, random excursions and random excursions variant tests.
As output, NIST STS reports a p-value which indicates whether the
given sequence has passed or not each test.
We implement and reproduce the algorithm previously proposed by
Rostami et al. [147] to generate and extract as many keys as possible
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from the cardiac signal to check the randomness property. This al-
gorithm has the following steps: get the sampling frequency for each
signal, which is available in an associated description record; Run Pan-
Tomkins’s QRS detection algorithm over the ECG signal to extract
the R-peaks; get the timestamp of each R-peak and calculate the time
difference between each pair of consecutive R-peaks to obtain the se-
quence of raw IPI values; apply a dynamic quantization algorithm to
each IPI to decrease the measurement errors and a Grey code to the
resulting quantized IPI values to minimize the error margin of the
physiological parameters, and; extract the four LSB from each coded
IPI value.
The results we obtain through the analysis, clearly show that a short
burst of bits derived from an ECG record may seem random, but large
files derived from long ECG records should not be used for security
purposes.
In Chapter 3, we carry out an analysis to check whether it is reasonable
or not assume that two different sensors can generate the same cryp-
tographic token. We systematically check if two sensors can agree on
the same token without sharing any type of information. Similarly to
other proposals, we include Error Correcting Code (ECC) algorithms
like Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) to the token generation.
These algorithms are known as fuzzy extractors and they are usually
composed of two main phases: generation and reproduction.
In the generation phase, a biometric signal w is received as input and
two parameters are given as output: a secret value R and a public
value P . In the reproduction phase, a fresh biometric signal w′ is given
as input together with the public parameter P , previously generated
in the generation phase. If and only if the distance between these
two biometric signals—typically the Hamming distance—is less than
a given threshold tr (Hamming(w,w′) < tr), then the same output R
will be retrieved.
We conclude that a fuzzy extractor (or another error correction tech-
nique) is not enough to correct the synchronization errors between
the IPI values derived from two ECG signals captured via two sensors
placed on different positions. In particular, we demonstrate that a
pre-processing of the heart signal must be performed before the fuzzy
extractor is applied.
Going one step forward and, in order to generate the same token on
different sensors, we propose a synchronization algorithm. To do so, we
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include a run-time monitor algorithm based on the satisfaction of three
important real-time properties: 1. the time between two consecutive
peaks of each ECG signal; 2. the relative time between peaks from the
different heart signals, and; 3. the total sampling time to return back
a valid token. After applying our proposed solution, we run again the
experiments with 19 public databases from the PhysioNet repository.
The only constraint to pick those databases was that they need at
least two measurements of heart signals (ECG1 and ECG2). As a
conclusion, running the experiments, the same token can be derived
on different sensors in most of the tested databases if and only if a
pre-processing of the heart signal is performed before extracting the
tokens.
In Chapter 4, we analyze the entropy of the tokens extracted from a
heart signal according to the NIST STS recommendation (i.e., SP 800-
90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation). When authors check the entropy of the generated tokens,
there is a subset of them who specifically claim to use the Shannon
entropy. On the contrary, there are others who just say that they test
the entropy, providing no more information or even there are some
authors who directly do not check the entropy but run some random
tests instead like the National Institute of Standard and Technology
Statistical Test Suite (NIST STS). However, as Rushanan et al. [149]
pointed out, this is not enough to claim that the ECG can be a good
source of entropy.
In 2012, the NIST STS published a draft with some recommendations
for the entropy sources used for random bit generation. The final doc-
ument (NIST SP 800-90B) was recently published—early 2018—and
can be seen in. This document introduces the minimum properties
that an entropy source must have to make it suitable for use by cryp-
tographic random bit generators, as well as the min-entropy which
represents the minimum value after executing a set of tests (estima-
tors) used to validate the quality of the entropy source. Note that the
min-entropy value is never higher than the Shannon entropy.
In this chapter, we use the min-entropy estimators proposed by the
NIST STS to check if the bit sequences extracted from the heart sig-
nal pass such estimators or not and thus we can consider the heart as
entropy data source. In particular, the estimators of the min-entropy
are: The most common value estimate, the collision estimate, the
Markov estimate, the compression estimate, the MultiMCW predic-
xvi
tion estimate, the lag prediction, the multiMMC prediction estimate,
the LZ78Y prediction estimate, the t-Tuple estimate and, the Longest
Repeated Substring (LRS) estimate.
We downloaded 19 databases from the Physionet public repository and
analyze, in terms of min-entropy, more than 160,000 files. Finally, we
propose other combinations for extracting tokens by taking 2, 3, 4 and
5 bits different than the usual four LSBs. Also, we demonstrate that
the four LSB are not the best bits to be used in cryptographic ap-
plications. We offer other alternative combinations for two (e.g., 87),
three (e.g., 638), four (e.g., 2638) and five (e.g., 23758) bits which are,
in general, much better than taking the four LSBs from the entropy
point of view.
Finally, the last Chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 5) summarizes
the main conclusions arisen from this PhD Thesis and introduces some
open questions.
Keywords: Randomness, Authentication, Privacy, Implantable Medi-
cal Devices, Inter-Pulse Intervals, Biometric.
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Abstract (Non-technical)
The proliferation of wearable and implantable medical devices has
given rise to an interest in developing security schemes suitable for
these devices and the environment in which they operate. One area
that has received much attention lately is the use of (human) biological
signals as the basis for biometric authentication, identification and the
generation of cryptographic keys.
More concretely, in this dissertation we use the Electrocardiogram
(ECG) to extract some fiducial points which are later used on cryto-
graphic protocols. The fiducial points are used to describe the points
of interest which can be extracted from biological signals. Some exam-
ples of fiducials points of the ECG are P-wave, QRS complex, T-wave,
R peaks or the RR-time-interval. In particular, we focus on the time
difference between two consecutive heartbeats (R-peaks). These time
intervals are referred to as Inter-Pulse Intervals (IPIs) and have been
proven to contain entropy after applying some signal processing algo-
rithms. This process is known as quantization algorithm. The entropy
that the heart signal has makes the ECG values an ideal candidate to
generate tokens to be used on security protocols.
Most of the proposed solutions in the literature rely on some ques-
tionable assumptions. For instance, it is commonly assumed that it
possible to generate the same cryptographic token in at least two dif-
ferent devices that are sensing the same signal using the IPI of each
cardiac signal without applying any synchronization algorithm; au-
thors typically only measure the entropy of the LSB to determine
whether the generated cryptographic values are random or not; au-
thors usually pick the four LSBs assuming they are the best ones to
create the best cryptographic tokens; the datasets used in these works
are rather small and, therefore, possibly not significant enough, or; in
general it is impossible to reproduce the experiments carried out by
other researchers because the source code of such experiments is not
usually available.
In this Thesis, we overcome these weaknesses trying to systemati-
cally address most of the open research questions. That is why, in
all the experiments carried out during this research we used a public
database called PhysioNet which is available on Internet and stores a
huge heart database named PhysioBank. This repository is constantly
being updated by medical researchers who share the sensitive informa-
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tion about patients and it also offers an open source software named
PhysioToolkit which can be used to read and display these signals.
All datasets we used contain ECG records obtained from a variety of
real subjects with different heart-related pathologies as well as healthy
people.
The first chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 1) is entirely dedicated
to present the research questions, introduce the main concepts used
all along this document as well as settle down some medical and cryp-
tographic definitions. Finally, the objectives that this dissertation
tackles down are described together with the main motivations for
this Thesis.
In Chapter 2 we report the results of a large-scale statistical study
to determine if heart signal is a good source of entropy. For this, we
analyze 19 public datasets of heart signals from the Physionet repos-
itory, spanning electrocardiograms from multiple subjects sampled at
different frequencies and lengths. We then apply both ENT and NIST
STS standard battery of randomness tests to the extracted IPIs. The
results we obtain through the analysis, clearly show that a short burst
of bits derived from an ECG record may seem random, but large files
derived from long ECG records should not be used for security pur-
poses.
In Chapter 3, we carry out an analysis to check whether it is reasonable
or not the assumption that two different sensors can generate the same
cryptographic token. We systematically check if two sensors can agree
on the same token without sharing any type of information. Similarly
to other proposals, we include ECC algorithms like BCH to the token
generation. We conclude that a fuzzy extractor (or another error cor-
rection technique) is not enough to correct the synchronization errors
between the IPI values derived from two ECG signals captured via
two sensors placed on different positions.
We demonstrate that a pre-processing of the heart signal must be
performed before the fuzzy extractor is applied. Going one step for-
ward and, in order to generate the same token on different sensors,
we propose a synchronization algorithm. To do so, we include a run-
time monitor algorithm. After applying our proposed solution, we run
again the experiments with 19 public databases from the PhysioNet
repository. The only constraint to pick those databases was that they
need at least two measurements of heart signals (ECG1 and ECG2).
As a conclusion, running the experiments, the same token can be de-
xix
rived on different sensors in most of the tested databases if and only
if a pre-processing of the heart signal is performed before extracting
the tokens.
In Chapter 4, we analyze the entropy of the tokens extracted from a
heart signal according to the NIST STS recommendation (i.e., SP 800-
90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation). We downloaded 19 databases from the Physionet public
repository and analyze, in terms of min-entropy, more than 160,000
files. Finally, we propose other combinations for extracting tokens by
taking 2, 3, 4 and 5 bits different than the usual four LSBs. Also,
we demonstrate that the four LSB are not the best bits to be used in
cryptographic applications. We offer other alternative combinations
for two (e.g., 87), three (e.g., 638), four (e.g., 2638) and five (e.g.,
23758) bits which are, in general, much better than taking the four
LSBs from the entropy point of view.
Finally, the last Chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 5) summarizes
the main conclusions arisen from this PhD Thesis and introduces some
open questions.
Keywords: Randomness, Authentication, Privacy, Implantable Medi-
cal Devices, Inter-Pulse Intervals, Biometric.
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Resumen (No técnico)
En los últimos años, el uso de dispositivos wearables ha aumentando
considerablemente en la población. Entre estos dispositivos podemos
destacar los relojes inteligentes o las pulseras que registran la activi-
dad física como los más usados. La característica principal de estos
dispositivos es que tienen sensores capaces de medir señales vitales de
la persona que los usa, como puede ser el oxigeno en sangre o el ritmo
cardiaco. Antes de que aparecieran los wearables, los dispositivos
médicos implantables como el marcapasos eran los únicos dispositivos
capaces de medir estas señales vitales.
Por otra parte, desde que los teléfonos móviles tienen acceso a Internet,
los llamados wearables pueden estar conectados con un teléfono móvil,
el cual almacena la información de las señales vitales recogida por los
sensores. Estos datos pueden, a su vez, ser mandados a servicios
externos como a plataformas de seguimiento deportivo o servicios de
telemedicina.
Debido a que la información extraída es altamente sensible, el interés
de la comunidad científica para desarrollar esquemas de seguridad ade-
cuados para este tipo de dispositivos y los entornos donde estos operan
ha aumentado. En concreto, esta Tesis se centra principalmente en el
uso de la señal cardiaca para extraer claves aleatorias que puedan ser
usadas posteriormente en protocolos de criptografía con el fin de garan-
tizar tanto la seguridad y privacidad del usuario como la integridad
de los datos registrados por los sensores.
La señal cardíaca se suele representar a través del Electrocardiograma
(ECG), donde se puede ver la actividad eléctrica del corazón en función
del tiempo. El ECG es una señal continua que contiene seis picos,
conocidos por las letras P, Q, R, S, T y U. Se ha demostrado en
investicaciones previas que la diferencia temporal—intervalo—entre
dos picos R consecutivos de la señal cardica, conocido como Inter-Pulse
Intervals (IPIs), contiene cierta entropía, haciendo que este intervalo
sea un posible candidato para generar números aleatorios.
Sin embargo, la mayoría de las soluciones propuestas en este área
asumen como ciertas algunas hipótesis que no se han sido investigadas
a fondo por la comunidad científica. Por ejemplo, los mecanismos que
se utilizan para comprobar la aleatoriedad de las claves generadas a
través de la señal cardíaca solamente tienen en cuenta la entropía; se
asume que es posible generar la misma clave desde dos dispositivos
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diferentes que están midiendo la misma señal sin aplicar ningún al-
goritmo de sincronización, o; se considera que los cuatro bits menos
significativos son la mejor opción para generar las claves aleatorias.
En esta Tesis, se ha investigado la veracidad de dichas hipótesis y si son
aplicables a esquemas reales de seguridad. Además, como los trabajos
realizados por otros investigadores previamente usaban bases de datos
pequeñas y el código fuente de sus experimentos no esta disponible.
En los experimentos llevados a cabo durante esta investigación se han
utilizado bases de datos públicas y heterogéneas (tanto en tamaño
como en la variedad de las patologias de los pacientes) que contienen
registros de señales ECG obtenidas del repositorio PhysioNet, la cual
almacena una enorme base de datos de señales fisiológicas. Además,
se han hecho público el código fuente necesario para reproducir los
experimentos realizados.
El primer capítulo está completamente dedicado a introducir y ex-
plicar los conceptos utilizados a lo largo de este documento así como
definiciones médicas, criptográficas o la naturaleza de los repositorios
públicos de señales cardíacas. También, se describen los objetivos
junto con las principales motivaciones para esta Tesis.
El segundo capítulo presenta los resultados de analizar en detalle si la
señal cardíaca es una buena fuente de entropía y se puede usar para
generar claves aleatorias. Para ello, descargamos 19 bases de datos
públicas de señales cardíacas del repositorio Physionet. Generamos
las claves a partir de los IPIs del ECG y posteriormente aplicamos los
tests estadísticos ENT y NIST STS para determinar la aleatoriedad
de los IPIs extraídos. Los resultados obtenidos muestran claramente
que cuando la señal es corta——en el tiempo, los claves peden pare-
cer aleatorias. Por el contrario, cuando se obtienen muchas claves
pertenecientes a la misma señal cardíaca, entonces las claves no son
aleatorias y por tanto no deben usarse con fines de seguridad.
En el tercer capítulo, se comprueba si es razonable o no asumir que dos
sensores diferentes midiendo la misma señal cardíaca pueden generar
la misma clave criptográfica. Para ello, usamos 19 bases de datos
del repositorio Physionet con, al menos dos mediciones de señales
cardíacas (ECG1 y ECG2). Inicialmente comprobamos que las claves
generadas de ambas señales eran muy diferentes. Con el objetivo de
generar la misma clave, propusimos un mecanismo de sincronización
de la señal previo a la extracción de claves. Tras analizar de nuevo
las claves obtenidas con el mecanismo de sincronización propuesto,
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fuimos capaces de generar la misma clave desde diferentes sensores en
la mayoría de las bases de datos.
En el capítulo cuatro, analizamos la entropía de las claves Inter-Pulse
Intervals (IPIs) extraídas de la señal cardíaca de acuerdo con la re-
comendación NIST STS (SP 800-90B Recommendation for the En-
tropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation). Para ello descarg-
amos 19 bases de datos de señales cardiacas del repositorio público
Physionet y analizamos más de 160.000 claves en términos de min-
entropía. Tras el análisis, demostramos que los cuatro bits menos sig-
nificativos no son los mejores bits para ser utilizados en aplicaciones
criptográficas y ofrecemos otras combinaciones alternativas para dos
(ej. 87), tres (ej. 638), cuatro (ej. 2638) y cinco (ej. 23758) bits
que, en general, son mucho mejores que utilizar los cuatro bits menos
significativos desde el punto de vista de la entropía.
Finalmente, en el último capítulo de la Tesis se resumen las principales
conclusiones y se introducen algunas líneas futuras.
Keywords: Aleatoriedad, Autenticación, Privacidad, Dispositivos Médi-
cos Implantables, Inter-Pulse Intervals, Biometría.
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1
Introduction
Biometric is defined as the unique physiological or behavioural fea-
tures of human body and thus, they can be used to identify persons.
According to some authors, biometrics should have a set of proper-
ties in order to be practically usable: acceptable, circumventive, col-
lectible, convenient, costless, permanent, performable, precise, simple,
storable, unique and universal [40, 82]. These properties are explained
in more detail as follows:
Acceptability There must be an agreement between persons and
technology in such a way that people have to allow their personal
biometric traits to be captured and evaluated.
Circumvention Which shows how easily the system can be imitated
using fraudulent methods.
Collectability The biometric trait must be gathered quantitatively,
i.e., each biometric feature should be gathered in order to au-
thenticate it.
Convenience The process of both measuring and storing the features
should be done in real time, i.e., should not be a time-consuming
task.
Cost The prize of storing biometric traits should be as cheaper as
possible.
Permanence It is crucial that the chosen trait should be sufficiently
invariant over a period of time, otherwise the original biometric
feature musst be periodically renewed.
Performance This property is not only related to the speed but also
to the accuracy, and robustness of technology used.
Precision Every feature should be different enough from every other
feature.
Simplicity The recording and transmission of the feature should be
easy enough to avoid errors.
Storability The biometric trait should be storable.
Universality This property ensures that everybody using a biomet-
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ric system should possess at least one particular trait that is
common for all the people.
Uniqueness Once the biometric feature is common for all the peo-
ple, the uniqueness property guarantees that the trait should be
sufficiently different so that users can be distinguished between
them.
Biometrics is split into two main groups according to the nature of
the features: behavioral and physical.
Behavioral Biometrics Behavioral biometrics is an area of study
in charge of measuring patterns in human activities which make people
uniquely identifiable.
Some examples of behavioral biometric features are:
Gait Analysis The way people walk together with image or video
analysis or by using the accelerometer of the smartphone [173]
can be used to identify people. This is known as gait recogni-
tion [203]. More information about the phases and cycles of the
human walk can be seen in [89].
Keystroke Dynamics The goal of this biometric system is to iden-
tify persons by monitoring the keyboard inputs and thus gen-
erating patterns about the way users type [118]. Some applica-
tions can be found in [23, 90] and some state-of-the-art surveys
in [87, 171].
Mouse Dynamics Mouse distance between two points on the screen,
the way the mouse is moved, the drag and drop of the elements
or the time that the mouse is idle can be used to identify and
authenticate people [51, 165]. A review performed in [83] sum-
marizes the main contributions performed in this area about
mouse dynamics authentication.
Signature Analysis Signature is the most extended biometric mech-
anism for people authentication [197, 47] due to devices like
touchpads or digital pens [109].
Voice ID This trait is based on multiple voice characteristics such as
vocal tracts, mouth, nasal cavities or lips to authenticate people.
However, despite this it is not a biometric trait which can be used
in large and scalable systems [82], it is a common technique to
be used together with other systems like fingerprint [30].
.
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Physical Biometrics Physical biometrics are related to the static
traits of a human body that are not subject to change during the time
over aging. Some examples of physical biometric features are:
Face Face trait is another wide extended and well known biometric
characteristic used nowadays in authentication systems. Eyes,
eyebrows, nose, lips and chin, are commonly used by measuring
their spatial relationships to authenticate people [82].
Fingerprint This trait refers to a flowing pattern on the fingertip
of an individual consisting of ridges and valleys [82]. It can
be acquired by using different technologies as optical sensors or
total internal reflection sensors. Fingerprint recognition systems
have been incorporated into a number of forensic, civilian and
commercial applications [111].
Hand and finger geometry Hand geometry recognition systems are
based on a number of measurements taken from the hand, in-
cluding its shape, size of palm, as well as lengths and widths
of the fingers [82]. Hand shape biometrics is attractive due to
the fact that it can be captured in a relatively user convenient,
shape information requires only low resolution images [48].
Heart Before Bao et al. [18], Poon et al. [144] and Bao et al. [17]
proposed in 2004, 2006 and 2008 respectively, different protocols
to secure BANs where the authors claimed that the ECG signal
can be used for biometric purposes. Before these works, there
was a believe that the ECG signal could not be used as biometric
trait [36]. More detail are given in the following Section.
Iris The complex iris texture carries very distinctive information use-
ful for personal recognition [82, 193]. It contains around 266
visible patterns, which forms the basis of several recognition al-
gorithms. Even on the same person, left and right irises are
different but they are unique to an individual and is stable with
age [53].
Retina A retina-based biometric involves analyzing the layer of blood
vessels situated at the back of the eye. It is claimed to be the
most secure biometric since it is not easy to change or replicate
the retinal vasculature [82]. Retinal scanning can be quite ac-
curate but does require the user to look into a receptacle and
focus on a given point. For these reasons, retinal scanning is not
warmly accepted by all users, even though the technology itself
can work well [105].
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Nowadays, the primary application of biometrics is to control access
to secure locations [105]. Biometric systems are deployed in office
buildings [127], casinos [148, 181], health environments [207, 98], im-
migration service [182], border control airports [1, 2], seaports [1],
border-crossing [1, 41] or security of in bank systems [188, 72] among
many other examples.
1.1 Heart Signals in Biometrics
This dissertation is focused on heart signals obtained via ECG, Photo-
plethysmographic (PPG) or Blood Pressure (BP) and, more concretely
on electrical heart signals extracted from the ECG. Traditionally, these
signals have been used for medical diagnostics, but recently the use of
the heart signals has been applied into security and privacy protocols
[7, 8, 17, 34, 136, 147, 158, 160, 162, 169, 185, 200, 205].
The main use of heart biometric signal is generate random numbers
[196] as a Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNG) and these num-
bers usually are part of key generation protocols in authentication
procedures [147, 160, 208].
A crucial part of many cryptographic system is the generation of ran-
dom numbers in order to provide high-quality of randomness and to
guarantee the safety and reliability of the security system. In other
words, the quality of the random number generator directly influences
how difficult it is to attack the system.
Therefore, in order to check if a generated numbers can be consid-
ered random, entropy is used to describe the amount of randomness
available. However, there are some public suites like ENT, NIST STS,
DieHard tool or TestU01 software that are can be used to evaluating
the randomness property [20].
Recent works have demonstrated that ECG signals can be also used
as a source of entropy for security purposes [7, 101, 160, 206]. In
particular, this is done by calculating the IPI which is the time-interval
between two consecutive R-peaks of the ECG.
Concretely, these authors have claimed that the LSBs of the IPI con-
tain a high degree of entropy [7, 8, 34, 136, 147, 158, 160, 162, 169,
185, 200, 205]. Therefore, this property of ECG is used in IPI-based
authentication, identification, and key generation protocols (e.g., [8,
158, 162, 185]). Also, the majority of the proposed works in this area,
e.g., [8, 17, 158, 162, 185, 205], conclude that the last 4-bits of each
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IPI have more entropy.
Nowadays, it is possible to find a myriad of devices equipped with
dedicated sensors to measure the heart signal, apart from the common
medical electrodes that record the ECG signal i.e., a IMD such as
pacemakers, there are some other wearable devices with PPG sensors
which record the blood pressure to get heart beats, i.e., wristbands or
even smartwatches.
Those sensors are include in the ambit of IoT and eHealth. Which con-
stantly gathering information about the medical condition of a subject.
Also, always every sensor are part of a BAN. Information gathered by
these networks contain highly sensitive data and provide security and
privacy is one of the most challenging tasks by the research community
[68, 134, 178].
1.2 ECG Signal Processing
In Figure 2.2 can be seen the typical shape of an ECG signal. In it, the
most representative characteristics of the signal can be seen. Peaks of
the waves like P, Q, R, S, T and U as well as the segments and the
intervals—which is the time when the waveform starts and ends. It
is worth mentioning that the QRS complex is the most characteristic
waveform of the ECG signal [113] and it starts when the Q wave begins
and ends when the S waveform finishes.
When using the ECG signal for Biometrics or cryptographic purposes
we essentially found two main ways of proceeding, 1) authors who
calculate directly the IPIs of the ECG, or; 2) authors who extract
some fiducial points by using a delineation algorithm. In the following
we will explain in more detail each procedures to extract information
that is used afterwards for cryptography.
1.2.1 IPIs and Quantization Algorithms
In 1999, Juels and Wattenberg introduced the term fuzzy commitment
[84]. In this cryptographic scheme for biometrics, authors proposed
to extract a key from a biometrical signal (process known as fuzzy
extractor). A fuzzy extractor is a mathematical function f which
takes a biometrical signal w and produces both a random string R
and a public parameter P . What makes fuzzy extractors particularly
interesting for biometrics is that, when the input changes slightly, i.e.,
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w′ = w + , the random output R remains invariant if and only if the
distance between these two biometric signals—typically the Hamming
distance—is less than a given threshold tr, i.e., Hamming(w,w′) < tr
[46].
Between 2001 and 2003 two papers [125, 172] analyzed the correlation
of the time interval between R-peaks, also known as Inter-Pulse Inter-
val (IPI), of the ECG and the Heart-Rate Variability (HRV). Authors
reached to the conclusion that time between R-R peaks and the HRV
can be considered to be similar when the patient is resting. Addition-
ally, authors demonstrated that after doing exercise, neither the R-R
nor the P-P intervals can be considered similar to the HRV.
Given these results aforementioned described, Bao et al. [18] published
one of the first papers, if not the first one, in 2004 proposing the ECG
to be used as authentication mechanism for biometrics by using the
time interval between consecutive R-peaks. Since then, several authors
have used this time interval between consecutive R-peaks to generate
random numbers. The process of transforming the ECG, which is a
continuous signal, into a discrete one is known as quantization or as
dynamic quatization.
1.2.2 Delineation of ECG
Since most of the clinically information that the ECG has, is in the
intervals and the amplitudes of the wave peaks and boundaries, an
algorithm must be used to extract such information from the ECG.
This procedure is known as delineation [113] and it is still challenging
nowadays. The first step to extract the fiducial points is to get an
R-peak [92]. After that, the QRS complex and the P and T waves can
be delineated. This is what most of the algorithms do and from there,
forward and backward seek windows can be defined and finally some
other techniques to enhance the needed waves and fiducial points can
be applied [112]. However, as Martinez et al. [113] pointed out, the
detection of the wave onset and offset directly from the ECG is not
trivial due to the signal amplitude is significantly low in comparison
to the wave boundaries. In addition to that, the noise level can also
be higher than the signal itself.
Both, in medical research as well as in other fields of engineering there
can be found several ways to calculate the delineation of the ECG.
Mathematical models [108], Wavelet Transforms (WTs) [4, 28, 146],
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hidden markov models [4, 60] or artificial intelligence algorithms [103,
115, 152] are just a few examples about how to obtain some fiducial
points from the ECG. However, in cryptography we could exclusively
find authors who use WTs.
1.2.2.1 Wavelet Transforms
The Wavelet Transform (WT) provides a description of the signal. By
applying a linear transform, the WT decomposes a signal into different
components at different scales, i.e., it decomposes the signal at a dif-
ferent frequencies. More formally, a wavelet is essentially used to refer
to a family of basis functions of the Hilbert space L2(Rn), generated
from a finite set of normalized functions ψi where i is chosen from a
finite set I, and from two operations: scaling (a), and translation (b).
More concretely, the WT of a signal x(t) is:
Wax(b) =
1√
a
∫ +∞
−∞ x(t)ψ
(
t− b
a
)
dt, a > 0 (1.1)
We can distinguish between two WTs: Continuous Wavelet Transform
(CWT) and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). CWT is typically
generated by letting both the translation and scale operations vary
continuously. On the contrary, DWT uses a pair of filters to succes-
sively isolate both low and high pass components of a signal [174].
Hence, due to the non-stationary nature of the ECG, the DWTs are
specially suitable for such a signal and the continuous repetition of its
patterns/waveforms, e.g., QRS complex or P and T waves, at different
frequencies [113, 15].
Martínez et al. [113] provides a detailed explanation about how, by
taking as a prototype wavelet (ψi) a smoothing function, discretizing
either or both parameters a or b and taking a dyadic grid on the
time-scale plane such that a = 2k and b = 2kl, where k controls
the dilation or translation and l the position of the wavelet function,
then the transform is then called dyadic wavelet transform, with basis
functions:
ψk,l(t) = 2−k/2ψ(2−kt− l); where k, l ∈ Z+ (1.2)
Roughly speaking, the main idea behind the DWT is that it anal-
yses the signal at different resolution through the decomposition of
the signal into several successive frequency bands. To do so, two set
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Figure 1.1: DWT decomposition of a signal sampled at 1 kHz.
functions are typically used: ψk,l(t) = 2−k/2ψ(2−kt − l) and φk,l(t) =
2−k/2ψ(2−kt− l), normally linked with the low pass and the high pass
filters respectively [43].
Let us explain the DWT concept with an illustrative example when
applied to ECG signals [15]. In Figure 1.1 we have included a decom-
position using wavelets of a signal x(t) sampled at 1kHz (like iafdb
[139] or ptbdb [24] databases). This decomposition is repeated in or-
der to increase the frequency resolution as well as the approximation
coefficients decomposed with both high (ψk,l) and low (φk,l) pass fil-
ters. Note that Figure 1.1 can also be represented as a binary tree,
known as filter bank [52], where nodes represent sub-spaces with dif-
ferent time-frequencies of the signal.
We have included a summary of the surveyed publications along with
the number of extracted information in bits, the year when they where
published together with the extraction algorithm used in the papers
can be seen in Table 1.4.
1.3 Data Acquisition
In this section we detail how the surveyed papers test their proposals
with respect to the heart signals. In particular, we found two main
groups: i) authors that use proprietary data, and; ii) authors who use
data from public repositories.
Regarding the first point, in general, it is impossible to test the cor-
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rectness of the papers based on proprietary data since authors did not
make public those data. We argue that in research all the data should
be public in order to allow others to reproduce the same results and
start from that point. In other words, let the science improve. If
repositories are private, not only researchers have to repeat the same
experiments once and again but also different results can be found for
the same problem and, as far as we know, there is nothing to com-
pare with, i.e., no one can be sure if the results extracted from the
experiments are correct or better than others or not.
On the other hand, we found in the literature three main public repos-
itories that authors have used in their research: the Telemetric and
ECG Holter Warehouse Project (THEW) [42], the Biosec [3], and;
the Physionet [57] datasets. Due to the amount of researchers who
use Physionet is in comparison to the other two mentioned databases
(see Table 1.1), we are significantly giving more information about
this repository, explaining its composition and how the data should
be read for future experiments on this field. Nevertheless, we still
give some brief descriptions about the other two datasets like how to
retrieve the data as well as the structure.
THEW Thew is a public repository created and maintained by
the University of Rochester Medical Center and it is available at
http://thew-project.org/index.htm. This repository is made of
22 main databases which go from healthy young ECGs to heart in-
formation about people with heart or renal diseases (see Table 1.2 for
a complete description of the repository). What makes this database
particularly interesting is the amount of healthy people that it has.
concretely, this repository has two databases named “E-OTH-12-0689-
025” and “E-HOL-03-0202-003” with ECGs of 689 and 202 healthy
patients respectively. In most of the databases of this repository, files
are given in both .cpp and .m formats to be managed under C++ and
Matlab respectively. Additionally, authors have published some other
features to read the ECG and the annotation files in Matlab directly
from their server3.
1It is not specified in the paper
2Authors claim they use 294 patients but qtdb only consists of 105 patients
3More info: http://thew-project.org/THEWFileFormat.htm
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Database(s)
Altop et al. [8] 50 subjects from the MIMIC II Waveform
Bao et al. [17] 99 subjects from a private repository
Bao et al. [16] 14 healthy subjects from a private repository
Camara et al. [28] private repository and 202 patients from E-
HOL-03-0202-003 (THEW dataset)
Hong et al. [71] 10 subjects from private dataset
Karthikeyan et al. [88] 47 subjects from mitdb and 23 from afdb
Kim et al. [91] PhysioNet1
Koya et al. [93] ptbdb and mitdb
Moosavi et al. [124] 15 subjects from mitdb
Pirbhulal et al. [143] 25 healthy from a private repository; 20 from
mitdb, and; 44 with cardiac diseases from a
private repository
Rostami et al. [147] 47 subjects from mitdb; 290 from ptbdb,
and; 250 from mghdb
Seepers et al. [160] 48 subjects from mitdb and fantasia
database
Seepers et al. [162] 42 subjects from mitdb and fantasia, and;
111 subjects from BioSec dataset
Vasyltsov et al. [184] private dataset
Xu et al. [195] Physionet1
Yao et al. [196] 294 patients from qtdb2
Zaghouani et al. [198] 36 subjects from nsrdb and 48 from mitdb
Zhang et al. [200] 20 subjects from a private dataset and 64
from edb
Zheng et al. [206] 18 from nsrdb; 79 from edb; 47 from mitdb,
and; 23 afdb
Zheng et al. [205] 18 subjects from nsrdb and 79 from edb
Table 1.1: Databases taken by authors.
BioSec Biosec is a repository created and maintained by researchers
from Toronto University by which users who want to download any of
the 7 databases must make a material transfer agreement. This repos-
itory is available at https://www.comm.utoronto.ca/~biometrics/
databases.html and it is essentially composed of databases of healthy
people. The specifications of this repository are in contradiction in the
official website so we decided not to include them as a table.
Physionet It is a public repository on Internet which stores a huge
heart database named PhysioBank. This repository is constantly
updated by medical researchers who share the sensitive information
about patients—without disclosing any other relevant information that
can link the real patients, and it also offers an open source software
named PhysioToolkit which can be used to read and display these sig-
nals. At the time of writing, Physionet has more than 75 databases
classified into two main families: clinical databases (include demo-
10
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Database SID Leads Sampling ECGs Patients Size
Acute Myocardial Infarction E-HOL-03-0160-001 3 200 Hz 160 93 15.2GB
Coronary Artery Disease E-HOL-03-0271-002 3 200 Hz 271 271 26.2GB
Healthy E-HOL-03-0202-003 3 200 Hz 202 202 19.2GB
Thorough QT study #1 E-HOL-03-0102-005 3 200 Hz 102 34 4.5GB
Thorough QT study #2 E-HOL-12-0140-008 12 1,000 Hz 140 70 267GB
Torsades de Pointes (TdPs) E-OTH-12-0006-009 12 180 Hz 6 6 1.3GB
Sotalol IV and History of TdPs E-OTH-12-0068-010 12 1,000 Hz 68 34 244MB
AF and cardioversion E-OTH-12-0073-011 12 1,000 Hz 73 73 1.7GB
Chest Pain (IMMEDIATE LR ECG) E-HOL-12-1172-012 12 180 Hz 1172 1154 338GB
Genotyped Long QT syndrome E-HOL-03-0480-013 2 or 3 200 Hz 480 307 43.2GB
Chest Pain (IMMEDIATE HR ECG) E-HOL-12-0171-014 12 1,000 Hz 171 171 296GB
Exercise testing and perfusion imaging E-OTH-12-0927-015 12 1,000 Hz 927 927 23GB
ESRD patients during and after hemodialysis E-HOL-12-0051-016 12 1000 Hz 51 51 187GB
FDA1- quinidine, verapamil, ranolazine, dofetilide E-OTH-12-5232-020 12 1000 Hz 5232 22 1.7GB
FDA2- quinidine, verapamil, ranolazine, dofetilide E-HOL-12-0109-021 12 1000 Hz 109 22 231GB
AF Conversion E-OTH-12-0089-022 12 1000 Hz 26 26 3.23GB
“Strict” LBBB E-OTH-12-0602-024 12 1 kHz 602 602 157MB
Young Healthy E-OTH-12-0689-025 12 500kHz 689 689 207MB
Collaborative studies (require the submission of a research proposal to an ad-hoc THEW committee)
DEFINITE Study (NorthWestern Univ.) E-HOL-03-0401-017 3 500 Hz 401 236 110GB
Occluded Artery Trial (Stony Brooke Univ.) E-OTH-03-0802-018 3 500 Hz 802 223 6GB
Quinidine (AZCERT) E-OTH-12-2365-019 12 500 Hz 2423 24 17MB
IQ-CSRC E-HOL-12-0118-023 12 1000 Hz 118 20 22.8MB
TOTAL 15TB
Table 1.2: Summary of the THEW databases. SID refers to the
unique ID in the repository; Leads refers to the number of leads acquir-
ing in the most recordings; Sampling refers to the sampling frequency
of the ECG waveforms; ECGs is the number of ECG recordings; Pa-
tients is the number of subjects involved, and; Size is the storage space
of the database.
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graphics, vital sign measurements made at the bedside, laboratory test
results, procedures, medications, caregiver notes, images and imaging
reports, and mortality) and waveform databases (high resolution con-
tinuous recordings of physiological signal). Each family has different
categories: biomedical, brain or cardiopulmonary signals. Addition-
ally, the health condition of the patients varies considerably: healthy
people, heart diseases, apnea or epilepsy condition among others.
When focusing on the structure of the files, we can have three main
different files: 1) header files (.hea). This files contain the metadata of
the record. 2) signal annotations (.atr). This files contain the anno-
tations of the biometrical data, and; 3) biometrical data (.dat). This
files have all the gathered personal information the patient. Apart
from those files, it is quite frequent to have a RECORDS file where all the
names of the files are written down as well as a file named ANNOTATORS
where the information of how to read the .atr files is explained.
We have included in Table 1.3 all the databases we found all along the
literature together with the number of patients that each one of the
databases is composed of (column 2), if more than once ECG channel
is provided (column 3) and a description that Physionet provides for
each one of them (column 4).
When Physionet is used on multiple scientific articles, we found that
authors use arbitrary databases. There is no formal framework, rules
or set of tests that authors should run in order to test and compare
their proposals with others. Hence, it is hard to objectively say which
one really solves what problem. Just to cite a particular example,
Zheng et al. [205] compare their proposal with Zhang et al.’s work [200]
in terms of the NIST STS performance. However, this comparison is
far from being objective since authors use both different samples and
different random tests. Despite of using the same database—edb, they
do not use the same number of patients apart from the fact that Zhang
et al. use 20 patients from a private repository whereas Zheng et al.
use 18 subjects from nsrdb.
1.3.1 Amount of Information per IPI
We can classify surveyed papers according to the number of bits of the
IPIs that authors take. We found in the literature a wide disparity in
this matter. There are authors who: i) do not mention the number of
taken bits [196, 198]; ii) take 2 bits [71]; iii) vary the number of taken
12
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Database Files Leads Sampling Heart condition
aami-ec13 [76] 10 1 720 Hz Tachycardia
afdb [55] 23 ≥2 0.1 Hz ∼ 40 Hz Atrial fibrillation
afpdb [119] 300 ≥2 128 Hz Paroxysmal atrial fibrillation
ahadb [77] 2 ≥2 250 Hz Healthy and ventricular ectopy
apnea-ecg [135] 77 1 100 Hz Tachycardia
cebsdb [54] 60 ≥2 5,000 Hz Healthy
cdb [121] 53 x 250 Hz Holter recordings
cudb [128] 9 x 250 Hz Ventricular problems
edb [170] 90 ≥2 250 Hz Myocardial and hypertension
fantasia [80] 40 1 250 Hz Healthy
iafdb [139] 32 ≥2 1,000 Hz Atrial fibrillation or flutter
incartdb [140] 75 ≥2 257 Hz Coronary artery disease
ltafdb [138] 84 ≥2 128 Hz Paroxysmal
mimic2wdb [151] 25328 ≥2 125 Hz Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
mitdb [120] 48 ≥2 360 Hz Arrhythmia
mghdb [192] 202 3 360 Hz Unstable patients in ICU
nsrdb [141] 18 ≥2 128 Hz No significant arrhythmias
nstdb [122] 15 ≥2 360 Hz Mitdb with noise
prcp [122] 10 ≥2 250 Hz Healthy
ptbdb [24] 545 14 1,000 Hz Myocardial and Healthy controls
qtdb [96] 105 ≥2 250 Hz Holter recordings
sddb [61] 22 ≥2 250 Hz Arrhythmia
shareedb [116] 139 ≥2 128 Hz Hypertension
slpdb [74] 18 ≥2 250 Hz Sleep apnea syndrome
stdb [6] 28 2 360 Hz Stress tests
svdb [63] 70 ≥2 128 Hz Partial epilepsy
szdb [5] 7 1 200 Hz Partial epilepsy
twadb [123] 100 ≥2 500 Hz Myocardial problems
vfdb [62] 22 ≥2 250 Hz Tachycardia
Table 1.3: Summary of the databases.
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bits [16, 200]; iv) take 4 bits [8, 91, 93, 147, 160, 195]; v) take between
5 and 8 bits [184, 206, 17, 162]; vi) take 16 bits [143, 205], or; vii) take
more than 16 bits [28, 88].
As it can be seen in Table 1.4, the majority of the surveyed papers ex-
tract 4 bits of information per IPI, however, this tendency is changing
since 2016 in favour of extracting more information nowadays. Only
two [91, 93] of the last published papers in this field still extracted 4
bits whereas others [124, 162, 143, 28, 88] have started to use more
information from the heart signal.
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of the number of papers published in Google
Scholar [75] about security and privacy in implantable medical devices
or wearables.
Security and privacy issues have been described as two of the most
challenging problems of IMDs and, more generally, wearables [134,
68, 178]. As can be seen in Figure 1.2 researchers have increased their
efforts in studying security and privacy in wearable and implantable
medical devices.
In this dissertation three main topics are covered in depth. First, we
systematically evaluate the heart signal, and more concretely, the ECG
as a source of random numbers to be used on cryptography protocols,
concluding that the four LSBs of each IPI should no be considered ran-
dom (see Chapter 2). Second, we evaluate if the common assumption
14
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Year Information per IPIs
Camara et al. [28] 2018 23 bytes
Karthikeyan et al. [88] 2018 4 chunks of 16 bits
Pirbhulal et al. [143] 2018 16 bits
Kim et al. [91] 2018 4 bits
Koya et al. [93] 2018 4 bits
Moosavi et al. [124] 2017 8 bits
Seepers et al. [162] 2017 8 bits
Zheng et al. [205] 2016 16 bits
Vasyltsov et al. [184] 2016 5 bits
Altop et al. [8] 2016 4 bits
Zheng et al. [206] 2015 7 bits
Seepers et al. [160] 2015 4 bits
Zaghouani et al. [198] 2015 No info is provided
Bao et al. [16] 2013 3 to 4 bits
Rostami et al. [147] 2013 4 bits
Zhang et al. [200] 2012 2 to 11 bits
Xu et al. [195] 2011 4 bits
Hong et al. [71] 2011 2 bits
Yao et al. [196] 2011 No info is provided
Bao et al. [17] 2008 8 bits
Table 1.4: Summary of the surveyed papers and the number of bits
extracted from IPIs.
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about if two sensors placed on different locations around the human
body can derive the same cryptographic key is realistic or not. We
conclude that a synchronization of the signal is needed before extract-
ing the random token (see Chapter 3). Finally, we evaluate the heart
signal as a source of entropy and more concretely, if the four LSBs
are the best bits to generate token with high entropy, concluding that
there are many other bits which can be taken to generate better tokens
(see Chapter 4). In particular, this Thesis is focused on the following
main objectives:
O1. Analyze if heart signals can be used to generate random numbers.
O2. Evaluate if two different sensors can derive the same token from
the heart signal.
O3. Propose a solution to generate the same token in two different
sensors.
O4. Appraise if heart signal can be considered a good source of en-
tropy.
1.5 Main Contributions & Organization
During this PhD several contributions in the field of security and pri-
vacy services based on biosignals for implantable and wearable devices
have been published. As a result of the achievement of the aforemen-
tioned objectives two main contributions have been accomplished:
C1. The first contribution of this PhD can be read in Chapter 2.
In it, we report the results of a large-scale statistical study to
determine whether such an assumption is (or not) upheld. For
this, we analyze 19 public datasets of heart signals from the
Physionet repository, spanning electrocardiograms from 1,353
subjects sampled at different frequencies and with lengths that
vary between a few minutes and several hours. We believe this
is the largest dataset on this topic analyzed in the literature.
We then apply a standard battery of randomness tests to the
extracted IPIs. Under the algorithms described in this chapter
and after analyzing these 19 public ECG datasets, our results
raise doubts about the use of IPI values as a good source of
randomness for cryptographic purposes. This has repercussions
both in the security of some of the protocols proposed up to now,
and also in the design of future IPI-based schemes.
C2. In Chapter 3 we address the problem of how two devices that
16
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are sensing the same heart signal can generate the same crypto-
graphic token by extracting them from the IPIs of each cardiac
signal. Our analysis is based on the use of a run-time monitor,
which is extracted from a formal model and verified against pre-
defined properties, combined with a fuzzy extractor to improve
the final result. We first show that it is impossible, in general, to
correct the differences between the IPIs derived from two cap-
tured ECGs signals when using only error correction techniques,
thus being impossible to corroborate previous claims on the feasi-
bility of this approach. Then, we provide a large-scale evaluation
of the proposed method (run-time monitor and fuzzy extractor)
over 19 public databases from the Physionet repository contain-
ing heart signals. The results clearly show the practicality of
our proposal achieving a 91% of synchronization probability for
healthy individuals. Additionally, we also conduct an exper-
iment to check how long the sensors should record the heart
signal in order to generate tokens of 32, 64 and 128 bits. Con-
trarily to what it is usually assumed (6, 12, and 24 seconds for
individuals with a heart rate of 80 beats-per-minute), the sensors
have to wait 13, 28 and 56.5 seconds on median, respectively, to
derive the same token from both sensors.
C3. In Chapter 4 we answer three questions: 1) Is the heart signals
a good source of entropy? 2) Are the four LSBs the best ones
to create the best token from the entropy point of view? 3)
Are there any other possible combinations of bits that achieve
more entropy than taken the four LSBs? In our analysis we do a
rigorous and in-depth study, analyzing cardiac signals from more
than 160,000 files from 19 databases of the Physionet public
repository following the NIST 800-90B recommendation. We
demonstrate that the choice of the IPI bits used to date may
not be the most correct (e.g., the combination of bits 2638 are
much better that the common assumed 5678). We offer other
alternative combinations for two (e.g., 87), three (e.g., 638), four
(e.g., 2638) and five (e.g., 23758) bits which are, in general, much
better than taking the four LSBs from the entropy point o view.
Finally, this dissertation summarizes the main conclusions arisen from
this PhD Thesis and introduces some open questions in Chapter 5.
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Heartbeats Do Not
Make Good
Pseudo-Random
Number Generators:
An Analysis of the
Randomness of
Inter-Pulse Intervals
2.1 Introduction
eHealth is a relatively novel term that is commonly used to refer to
healthcare services delivered through—or making an extensive use of—
technology and telecommunications systems. eHealth can be seen as a
special subset of the IoT, where “things” are essentially sensors which
are constantly gathering information about the medical condition of a
subject. Additionally, when these sensors are placed in, on, or around
the human body to monitor anywhere and anytime vital signs of the
bearer, it is said to be part of a BAN1. BAN devices can communicate
with a central device (also known as hub, which is commonly imple-
mented by a smartphone) with Internet connectivity, and in a near
future all these devices will be able to interact directly between each
other.
This chapter is based on this [130] publication
1Also known as a BSN
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Information gathered by a BAN, which may contain highly sensitive
data privacy-wise, is usually shared with other devices in the network
and can also be sent to public servers in order to be accessible by differ-
ent people such as medical staff, the user’s personal trainer or just for
private purposes. It has been thought that IMD such as pacemakers,
insulin pumps or cochlear implants were the only devices in charge of
measuring biological information. However, there are many other gad-
gets such as smartphones, wristbands or even the smartwatches that
can be used to sense some vital signs of the bearer without interfering
in her life.
Secure this network and the gathered sensitive data has been identi-
fied as one of the most challenging tasks by the research community
[134, 68, 178] before deploying it in a real scenario. As an example,
imagine that if someone who is equipped with sensors whose informa-
tion is shared via wireless, it could be easy for an attacker to sniff the
communication channel in order to listen to the transmitted packages
and get some knowledge about the bearer. Therefore, new crypto-
graphic protocols are needed not only to protect the user’s identity
but also to protect the integrity of the patient’s medical data [37, 106].
Biometrics refer to identification and authentication methods that,
using biological signals, can identify or validate the identity of a per-
son. In the last years, several works have been focused on biometric
authentication and identification [147, 160, 208]. This kind of authen-
tication systems have a great potential because each biological trait
must be universal, collectable, unobtrusive, permanent, unique and
difficult to circumvent [145]. Biometric signals can be classified into
physiological and behavioural signals [49]. Examples of physiological
signals include face recognition, fingerprint, iris, ECG, Electromyo-
gram (EMG) or Galvanic Skin Response (GSR). Behavioural traits
have also been proposed, such as the voice, signature, keystroke dy-
namics or lip movements, among others.
Biometrics have also been used to generate personal cryptographic
keys [196] by using biological signals as a PRNG. Therefore, in order
to check if a given sequence of numbers can be considered random,
there are some well known tests like Shannon’s entropy, Monte Carlo
test or frequency test among others. However, instead of using a
subset of tests, there are some public suites like ENT2 test—a software
2ENT can be downloaded at http://www.fourmilab.ch/random/
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published by the NIST STS, DieHard 3 tool or TestU014 software that
are more likely when evaluating the randomness property [20]. It is
important to remark that ENT test was initially though for general
purposes whereas the other suites are focused on guaranteeing some
security properties.
2.1.1 Overview of Our Results
In the last years, entropy analysis has been shown as an effective
mechanism to assist doctors in medical problems [64]. For instance,
the analysis of brain images can help to the detection of some brain
diseases [190, 201]. Another good example is the detection of cardiac
problems through the analysis of ECG records [94, 107, 166]. In ad-
dition, and outside of the medical context, recent works have demon-
strated that ECG signals can be also used as a source of entropy for
security purposes [7, 101, 160, 206]. In particular, this is done by cal-
culating the IPI which is the time-interval between two consecutive
R-peaks of the ECG. If an arbitrary peak R occurs at the time tR(i),
then IPI can be computed as the time difference between tR(i) and
tR(i−1): IPI(i) = tR(i) − tR(i−1), as can be seen in Figure 2.2. We refer
the reader to Section 2.2.2 for more details about the components of
an ECG signal, and to Section 2.4.2 for the IPI extraction algorithm.
Nowadays, apart from the common medical electrodes that record the
ECG signal, there exist a myriad of devices equipped with dedicated
sensors to measure the heart signal. For instance, measuring the heart
rate can determine the efficiency of a workout or even the calories that
someone has burnt. In order to do so, the exercise machines used in
gyms normally have some metallic areas located on the support bars
which interpret small electrical signals passing through the skin. There
are, however, some other wearable devices with PPG sensors which
record the blood pressure to get heart beats, i.e., a device illuminates
the skin with a light source like a LED to detect the changes in the
light absorption. Nowadays PPG monitors are usually found in most
of the wristbands and smartwatches. Some other mechanisms like
chest bands are commonly used by athletes when they are training or
even in competitions to check their heart rates.
Many authors have claimed that the LSBs of the IPI contain a high
3Diehard can be downloaded at http://stat.fsu.edu/pub/diehard/
4TestU01 can be downloaded at http://simul.iro.umontreal.ca/testu01/tu01.html
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degree of entropy [7, 8, 34, 136, 147, 158, 160, 162, 169, 185, 200,
205]. In addition, most of these authors use some public databases to
prove this entropy property and thus, with this method, the resulting
bits can be considered as random numbers and can be part of key
generation protocols in authentication procedures.
Recent IPI-based authentication, identification, and key generation
protocols (e.g., [8, 158, 162, 185]) suffer from two main weaknesses.
First, they only use measures of entropy to determine whether the
generated cryptographic material (keys and other intermediate values
such as nonces) are random or not. Second, the datasets used in
these works are rather small and, therefore, possibly not significant
enough. Additionally, such datasets contain ECG signals obtained
both from healthy subjects and others that suffer some heart-related
pathology, and it is unclear whether this feature has some influence on
the overall quality (i.e., randomness) of the derived bits. Some of these
observations have been already raised in [20], in which authors pointed
out the need to perform a more sound assessment of the quality of the
generated keys using larger datasets and additional randomness tests.
Nevertheless, the code which authors run these experiments is not
available.
In this Chapter, we overcome these weaknesses by performing an anal-
ysis of the randomness of 19 different public databases containing heart
signals. Our contributions can be summarized as:
• We have downloaded 19 public databases with information about
heart signals from different people. All datasets are taken from
the Physionet network5 [57], which contain heart signals from
both healthy volunteers and people with cardiac conditions. We
then extracted the last four bits of the IPI of each person per
database, thus creating a bit stream whose quality can be tested.
In doing so, we attempt to address the gap detected in [20].
• We analyze all files independently to check if the ECG can be
considered to be a good random number generator. To do so,
two random number suites (ENT—general purpose—and NIST
STS—security) have been run over all previously generated files.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that discusses
how the ECG signal should be used in cryptographic protocols
as a source of random numbers. Our scripts are made public6 to
5https://physionet.org/physiobank/database/#ecg
6https://github.com/aylara/Random_ECG
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facilitate the replication of our results by other researchers.
• Contrarily to prior proposals, we demonstrate that the ECG
signal contains some degree of randomness but its use in crypto-
graphic applications is questionable. Some databases obtained
reasonable results on either ENT or NIST STS. However none of
the tested databases obtained good results on both at the same
time except the mitdb database.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides
some background on biometric authentication according to ECG and
the basic description of some random tests. Section 2.4 describes the
evaluation of our implementations and a discussion of the results. This
Chapter ends with some conclusions in Section 2.5.
2.2 Background
In this section we provide some background on related work: biometric
authentication, IPI-based authentication and key derivation protocols,
and randomness tests.
2.2.1 Biometric Authentication
Biometric protocols provide security services such as the authentica-
tion and identification of a given person among a large set of people.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the standard pipeline of a biometric system, from
the signal acquisition and preprocessing to the final decision-making
process to identify/authenticate the subject. At the core of the sys-
tem there is a pattern-matching process between a freshly acquired
template built from the subject’s signal and a previously stored tem-
plate. The matching process is usually done by defining an acceptance
threshold and calculating the Hamming distance between the both
templates to decide whether the subject is or is not authenticated.
The signal is usually acquired by sensors that can be located in, on,
or around the human body. Examples of well-known biometric signals
include the iris [193], the fingerprint and face [50, 110], the voice [82]
and the ECG [167].
Biometric approaches have been combined with traditional crypto-
graphic primitives in several ways, including the replacement of match-
ing algorithms by secure versions [81, 179], using biometric templates
in Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), homomorphic encryption
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User
Collect Images Pre-Processing Fingerprint Extract Features
Train Classifier
StoreMatch
Figure 2.1: Architecture of a generic biometric recognition system.
schemes [39, 50, 180], or with elliptic curves [33, 59]. Apart from
cryptographic proposals, the use of biometric signals to generate cryp-
tographic keys has been widely studied in the literature (see, e.g.,
[8, 34, 129, 136, 147, 158, 162, 169, 185, 200, 205]). In most of these
works, authors obtain a biological signal from different sensors or de-
vices, such as the Electroencephalogram (EEG), the PPG, the ECG
or accelerometers and check whether the signals can be considered
random or not. To do so, the common practice is to extract some
feature(s) from the signal and then run several randomness tests to
validate the hypothesis.
Particularly, the use of IPIs has gained a special attraction in cryp-
tographic application as a random number generator. For instance,
in [73, 117, 186] to generate a private key, in [147] to be part of an
authentication protocol, in [99, 195, 199] as an alternative to classical
key establishment protocols or in [85] as part of a proximity detection
protocol. It is worth noting the transcendence that IPIs have in all
aforementioned scenarios and why it is crucial the random number
generation.
2.2.2 IPI-Based Security Protocols
Figure 2.2 shows a typical ECG trace. The signal contains six different
peaks, known by the letters P, Q, R, S, T and U. Heartbeats are
commonly measured as the time distance between two consecutive
R-peaks. This is known as Inter-Pulse Interval (IPI), and several
works published over the last decade have noted that the sequence
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Figure 2.2: A typical electrocardiogram (ECG) signal and its main
features: peaks (P, Q, R, S, T, U), waves, segments and intervals.
of IPIs contains some entropy. To obtain such random bits, each IPI
should be first quantized, i.e., represented in binary code using some
coding scheme. Most works omit the details about the particular
coding scheme used, which is quite unfortunate since this is a critical
component for the entropy (or lack thereof) of the resulting binary
sequence. One notable example is the work of Rostami et al. [147],
which will be described in more detail in Section 2.4.2 since it is the
coding scheme used in this Chapter.
The majority of the proposed works in this area, e.g., [8, 17, 158, 162,
185, 205], conclude that the last 4-bits of each IPI can be used as a
random number because of their high entropy. Thus, if an authenti-
cation protocol requires a 128 bit key to work, it would be necessary
to acquire 32 IPIs (i.e., at least 33 consecutive R-peaks). Considering
that a regular heart beats at 50-100 bpm, the key generation process
would take between 20 and 40 seconds. To prove that the extracted
bits have a certain level of randomness, most works use either the
common Shannon or Rényi entropies [185]—which are not enough to
claim the randomness property of a sequence of beats. Additionally, in
[17, 35, 147, 195, 200, 205], authors remark the same claims about the
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randomness of the IPIs by running the NIST STS battery of random-
ness tests, whereas in [160] authors rely on the ENT suite. Table 2.1
summarizes the datasets that the existing works in this area have used.
Additionally, in the last column, the number of executed tests can be
seen where, for instance NIST STS(5/15) means that authors have
run 5 tests out of 15 that the NIST STS suite has. Note that [35] is
the only work where authors run all tests that NIST STS is composed
of. We were not able to find the main reasons of running a subset of
tests in the rest of the works that use NIST STS.
Work Dataset Randomness Test
[8] 50 subjects from the MIMIC II Waveform Shannon’s Entropy
[17] 99 subjects from a private dataset NIST STS (5/15)
[35] 50 subjects from a private dataset NIST STS (15/15)
[71] Not specified NIST STS (6/15)
[147] 47 subjects from mitdb; 290 from ptdb; 250 from mghdb NIST STS (8/15)
[158] mitdb (no info is given) Shannon’s Entropy
[162] mitdb (no info is given) Shannon’s Entropy
[160] mitdb (no info is given) ENT
[185] mitdb (no info is given) Rényi’s Entropy
[195] PhysioNet7 NIST STS (9/15)
[200] 84 subjects from a private dataset and European ST-T NIST STS (5/15)
[205] 18 subjects from MIT-BIH and 79 from the European ST-T NIST STS (10/15)
Table 2.1: Datasets and number of run tests used by related work.
2.2.3 Randomness Tests
One key aspect of all IPI-based protocols is the assumption that some
bits (four, typically) of each IPI are highly entropic. This condition is
necessary, but not sufficient to guarantee the security of the protocol.
In other words, high entropy does not necessarily imply randomness.
Therefore, more sophisticated tests should be also applied to ensure
that the values are indistinguishable from a random sequence.
In this Chapter, we have used ENT [189] and NIST STS [20] suites
to evaluate how good the generated random numbers are. In partic-
ular, ENT is a suite composed of the following tests: entropy, Chi-
Square, arithmetic mean, Monte Carlo, and serial correlation coeffi-
cient statistical tests. Finally, ENT reports the overall randomness
results after running the aforementioned tests. On the contrary, NIST
7It is not specified in the paper
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STS is a suite made of fifteen statistical tests: frequency monobit
and block tests, runs, longest run of ones in a block, binary matrix
rank, discrete Fourier Transform (spectral) test, overlapping and non-
overlapping template matching, Maurer’s Universal Statistical tests,
linear complexity, serial, approximate entropy, cumulative sums, ran-
dom excursions and random excursions variant tests. Finally, NIST
STS reports a p-value which indicates whether the given sequence has
passed or not each test.
For completeness, we refer the reader to the Section 2.3 where we
provide a brief description of each one of the tests that form part of
both NEST and NIST STS suites.
2.3 Random Tests
2.3.1 ENT
ENT [189] is a battery of tests used to evaluate pseudorandom num-
ber generators. The program reports the overall randomness results
after running five different statistical tests: entropy, Chi-Square, arith-
metic mean, Monte Carlo, and serial correlation coefficient. A brief
description of each test is given next.
Entropy Test. This test measures the amount of information of the
sequence, expressed as a number of bits per character. The
higher the result, the more random the sequence is considered.
Chi-square Test. The Chi-Square test is one of the most commonly
used tests and is extremely sensitive to errors in pseudorandom
sequence generators. The test computes the chi-square distribu-
tion for the input stream of bits and provides the result both as
an absolute number and a percentage indicating how frequently
a truly random sequence would exceed the calculated value.
Arithmetic Mean. The value of this test indicates the result of
adding up all bytes in the sequence and dividing it by the se-
quence length (in bytes). The closer the result is to 128, the
more random the results.
Monte Carlo Value for pi. This test estimates the value of pi through
a standard Monte Carlo method using the input sequence, which
is considered random when the computed value is close to the
true value of pi. The test outputs both the estimated value of pi
and the error.
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Serial Correlation Coefficient. This test attempts to capture cor-
relations in the sequence by checking how much each byte in the
stream depends upon the previous one. The closer the result is
to 0, the more random the sequence.
2.3.2 NIST STS
The NIST STS test suite [20] is a set of fifteen statistical tests to
evaluate random and pseudo-random number generators used in cryp-
tographic applications. These tests are often used as a first step in
spotting low-quality generators, but they are by no means a substitute
for cryptanalysis. In other words, successfully passing all tests does
not guarantee that the generator is strong enough.
All tests take as input a sequence of (binary) numbers and return a
p-value that is then used to assess whether the sequence passed or not
each test. In the following we briefly describe each test in turn.
Frequency (Monobit) Test. This is one of the simplest test which
checks if the input sequence has a balanced number of ones and
zeroes (i.e., if the distribution of bits is uniform).
Frequency Test within a Block. This test is an extension of the
frequency monobit test, which can be considered as a particular
case with the block size M equal to 1. For values M > 1,
this test checks if the frequency of ones in an M -bit block is
approximately M/2.
The Runs Test. This test measures whether the number of runs of
ones and zeroes of various lengths are as would be expected for
a truly random sequence [20]. A run is a consecutive sequence
of bits with the same value. The test returns a p-value per block
length.
Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block. This test checks the length of
the longest run of ones in a previously defined block with length
M and compares it with the expected value for a truly random
sequence.
The Binary Matrix Rank Test. This test generates m×n binary
matrices over GF (2) using the values of the input sequence
(each row of a matrix is a substring of the sequence) and checks
whether the ranks are linearly dependent.
Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test. This test calculates
the Discrete Fourier Transform of each subsequence of bits and
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computes the peaks, which might reveal patterns in the original
sequence. The test uses a threshold t =
√
log(1/0.05)n, where n
is the length of the sequence. If the number of peaks is at most
5%, the sequence can be considered as random.
Non-overlapping Template Matching Test. In this test, the ran-
dom sequence is split into M substrings of length l. The test
seeks for the number of occurrences of a given template. If the
pattern is found, the algorithm resets the substringM to the bit
after the found pattern, otherwise M is reset to the next bit.
The Overlapping Template Matching Test. This test is identi-
cal to the non-overlapping template matching test but using
overlapping substrings (i.e., using a sliding window that ad-
vances 1 bit at a time).
Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” Test. The purpose of this test
is to detect if the sequence can be significantly compressed with-
out loss of information. One of the main drawbacks of this test
is that it requires a substantially long sequence for the result to
be relevant.
The Linear Complexity Test. This test computes the linear com-
plexity of the input sequence. If the value is too short, the
sequence is not considered random enough.
The Serial Test. The focus of this test is to calculate the frequency
of all possible overlappingM -bit patterns in the whole sequence.
That is, each M -block should have the same probability of ap-
pearing than any other M -bit pattern.
The Approximate Entropy Test. This test is focused on the fre-
quency of all possible overlapping m-bit pattern in a sequence.
In short, this test compare the frequency of two adjacent lengths
(m and m+ 1) to the expected result for a random sequence.
The Cumulative Sums Test. In this test, zeroes are converted to
negative ones and ones remain the same. This test is based on
the maximum distance from zero of a random walk defined by
the cumulative sum of the sequence. For a random sequence,
the cumulative sum should be close to zero.
The Random Excursions Test. This test calculates the number of
cycles having exactly K visits in a cumulative sum random walk,
which is derived from partial sums.
The Random Excursions Variant Test. This test is similar to the
random excursion test but, in this case, the goal is to detect de-
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viations from the expected number of visits to various states in
the random walk.
2.4 The Randomness of IPI Sequences
This section describes our experiments to analyze the randomness of
the IPI values and a discussion of the obtained results.
2.4.1 Dataset
For consistency with previous research in this area, we have first down-
loaded the mitdb, ptbdb and mghdb Physionet8 databases from [57]
and we have tried to replicate the experimental setting used by both
Rostami et al. in [147] and Xu et al. in [195]. The results, however,
were impossible to reproduce due to the lack of information that au-
thors provide in the original papers. The downloaded databases con-
tain the information of several subjects and we do not know how the
original experiments were run, e.g., i) by acquiring the 4 LSBs of the
ECG of each one of the subjects and after that running (a subset) of
the NIST STS tests per person; ii) if the authors generated one single
file with the information of all subjects belonging to the same database
and then this file was used as input of some of the NIST STS tests;
or, iii) if the authors generated one single file with the information of
all subjects of all databases and then they run (a subset) of the NIST
STS tests.
Due to the fact that only one single value was given in [147] regarding
the final results of the NIST STS and also that at certain moment,
authors claim that they use an aggregate of different databases for
the error generation, we assume that authors used the iii) approach:
they created one single file with the 4 LSBs of the IPI of different
people belonging to different datasets. Nevertheless, we consider that
this is not a realistic experiment because of the heterogeneous of the
databases (see Table 2.2) as it was also pointed out by [20]. On the
contrary, authors in [195] neither provide the achieved results of the
NIST STS nor they say which database(s) they use for testing.
For these reasons, we have substantially extended this setting to 16
additional datasets of ECGs also present in the Physionet repository.
8The software package to access the data repository can be found at https://physionet.org/
physiotools/wfdb.shtml
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All these datasets contain ECG records obtained from a variety of
real subjects with different heart-related pathologies in many cases.
Table 2.2 shows the main features of the 19 datasets used in this
work. Also, we have computed the median value of the extracted IPIs
per file (person) per database. For instance, it is easy to argue that
heart signals acquired from people equipped with holters (cdb) cannot
be used to prove that the heart signal is random enough. Similar cases
occur with iafdb, ptdb or twadb databases with medians of 37, 68 and
87 IPIs respectively.
In order to avoid the aforementioned problems and to allow other
researchers to reproduce the results, we have split up the results in
their corresponding databases. After that, we have extracted the 4
LSBs of each subject and run the random tests (NIST STS and ENT
suites) to each individual file (corresponding to each subject of each
database) to evaluate how good the generated random numbers are.
Finally, the results are grouped per pathology (database) and we give a
percentage of the files (persons) which successfully passed the random
tests.
2.4.2 IPI Extraction
Previous works in this area found out that the four LSBs of each IPI
are highly entropic [147, 195]. We replicated this process as follows.
We first used a Matlab script available at the Physionet repository9
to obtain the ECG signal for each record (person) in each one of the
19 datasets. We next applied the following steps:
1. Get the sampling frequency for each signal, which is available in
an associated description record.
2. Run Pan-Tomkins’s QRS detection algorithm [132] over the ECG
signal to extract the R-peaks.
3. Get the timestamp of each R-peak and calculate the difference
between each pair of consecutive R-peaks to obtain the sequence
of raw IPI values.
4. Apply a dynamic quantization algorithm to each IPI to decrease
the measurement errors. This process consists in generating dis-
crete values from an ECG (continuous signal).
5. Apply a Grey code to the resulting quantized IPI values to in-
crease the error margin of the physiological parameters.
9https://physionet.org/physiotools/software-index.shtml
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Dataset #Records Frequency(Hz)
Median
(IPIs) Pathology
aami-ec13 [76] 10 720 48.5 Tachycardia
apnea-ecg [135] 77 100 15786 Tachycardia
cdb [121] 53 250 12 Holter recordings
cebsdb [54] 54 5,000 175 Healthy
cudb [128] 9 250 415 Ventricular problems
edb [170] 90 250 4405 Myocardial and hypertension
iafdb [139] 5 1,000 37 Atrial fibrillation or flutter
mitdb [120] 46 360 1113 Arrhythmia
mghdb [192] 202 360 2426 Unstable patients in ICU
nstdb [122] 14 360 1246 Mitdb with noise
ptbdb [24] 545 1,000 68 Myocardial and Healthy controls
qtdb [96] 104 250 520.5 Holter recordings
shareedb [116] 23 128 46910 Hypertension
slpdb [74] 17 250 11517 Sleep Apnoea syndrome
stdb [6] 28 360 1243 Stress tests
svdb [63] 47 128 1192 Partial epilepsy
szdb [5] 7 200 4439 Partial epilepsy
twadb [123] 5 500 87 Myocardial problems
vfdb [62] 17 250 1800 Tachycardia
Table 2.2: The 19 datasets used in this work. For each dataset
the table provides the number of records (subjects), the sampling fre-
quency, the median value of IPIs per database and the pathology (if
any) of the subjects involved in each dataset.
32
2. Heartbeats do not make good PRNG
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Time (s) 104
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
B
ea
ts
tre
am
s 
(b
its
)
105
avg. beatstreams
polyfit
error
Figure 2.3: Statistical analysis of beatstreams (in bits) and time (in
seconds).
6. Extract the 4 LSB from each coded IPI value.
Each sequence of extracted bits per record of each dataset is stored in
separate files for subsequent analysis.
Additionally, we have also conducted one more experiment in Matlab
under a MacPro laptop with 4Gb of RAM to estimate how long the
signal should be to extract a stream of length x bits. To do so, we have
computed the average number of IPIs and the length average of the
signal of the nineteen databases. In Figure 2.3 these results can be seen
where we can conclude that the relation between time and the length
of bits is linear and for instance, after almost 4 hours we will have
approximately 60,000 bits which can be used as random numbers. It
is also noticeable that these results are consistent with the hypothesis
that in order to extract a valid cryptographic key, only a few seconds
are enough. In other words, to generate a cryptographic key of 128
bits, a device should wait between 20 and 50 seconds to create that
key. It is also remarkable that depending on the scenario this time
constraint might be not feasible to be deployed—e.g., a person who is
suffering from a heart attack cannot wait for a minute to authenticate
its pacemaker with the caregiver device.
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Test Optimal value Threshold Counter
Entropy 1.0 >0.85 0.99
Optimum compression <0% <5% 0%
Chi square 5% < χ˜2 <95% 5% < χ˜2 <95% 1%
Arithmetic mean 0.5 0.4< x¯ <0.6 0.46
Monte Carlo value for pi error=0% error <5% 12.38%
Serial Correlation coefficient 0 < 10−1 or < 10−2 0.012
Table 2.3: ENT tests: optimal values, thresholds used to consider
that a sequence passes the test, and results obtained for a counting
sequence.
2.4.3 Measuring Randomness
In this section we discuss the results of applying both the NIST STS
and ENT test suites to the datasets discussed above.
2.4.3.1 ENT
As described in Section 2.3.1, the ENT suite comprises 6 tests of ran-
domness. Table 2.3 shows the optimum value for each one of them.
Along with this, we also provide two additional values for each test:
i) a threshold, which constitutes a more affordable value for each test
since the optimal output is quite restrictive and most sequences would
fail the tests otherwise, and; ii) the test result obtained for an input se-
quence consisting of a simple counter value from 0 to 214. The purpose
of this experiment is just to demonstrate that the result of a single
test cannot be used alone to claim evidence of randomness; see, e.g.,
the output achieved by the counting sequence for the entropy, the
arithmetic mean, the serial correlation coefficient and the optimum
compression.
The results obtained after applying the 6 ENT tests to each one of the
files (persons)—with the IPIs of their ECG signals in our 19 datasets—
can be seen in Table 2.4. Each cell in the table provides the percentage
of persons who pass the test using the threshold shown in Table 2.3.
For instance, in the case of mitdb database, we have generated 46
files, belonging to 46 persons involved in this database, with a me-
dian of 1113 IPIs per file. The results for this database are that all
persons pass both the entropy and optimum compression tests (100%)
but none of them pass the chi square test (0%); 45 out 46 pass the
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arithmetic mean and the serial correlation tests (97.83%); and, 22 out
of 46 pass the Monte Carlo value for pi (47.83%).
Overall, the first noticeable observation is that these results are quite
good across all datasets in the entropy, optimum compression, and
serial correlation whereas for the chi square the results are catas-
trophic. The situation is similar for the Monte Carlo for pi test where
all databases fail but szdb, slpdb, edb and shareedb achieving 71.43%,
74.47%, 60% and 55.52%, respectively. On the contrary, the arithmetic
mean test achieve good results but the vfdb, and the cudb fail that
test with 17% and 44.44%, respectively.
Looking at the results from a dataset perspective, we were not able
to identify if there exists some correlation among the tests results
with the information available to us (number of samples, sampling
frequency, signal length, IPIs per file or characteristics of the sub-
jects). See also the discussion provided later on in Section 2.4.4 for an
additional analysis on this.
2.4.3.2 NIST STS
In Section 2.3.2 a description of all the fifteen tests that comprises
this suite can be read. As a common feature, all NIST STS tests are
parameterized by a variable n which means the length of bits of the
processed bitstream. Additionally, some of the tests can also detect
local non-randomness: frequency test within block, overlapping and
non-overlapping template matching, Maurer’s “Universal Statistical”,
linear complexity, serial and approximate entropy tests. These tests
are also parameterized by a second variable denoted as m or M. Those
tests which use m parameter are mainly focused on detection of m-bit
patterns in the stream whereas those tests which use M parameter,
check the distribution of the specific feature across n/M blocks of
equal size (M bits). In Table 2.5 the minimum requirements in terms
of length can be seen.
Furthermore, if we take into account the values of Table 2.2 regarding
the length (median) of our datasets, we cannot run the original NIST
STS with enough confidence level. The Physionet datasets are irregu-
lar in their size, with several of them having too small size to be used
with the original tests. In order to circumvent the length constraints
that the original NIST STS has, we have used a variant [56] of the
original software package.
Table 2.6 provides the success rate obtained for the 15 NIST STS
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cebsdb 100% 100% 0% 50% 10% 60%
ptbdb 99.82% 100% 0% 97.98% 22.20% 99.63%
twadb 100% 100% 0% 80% 0% 100%
iafdb 100% 100% 0% 100% 40% 100%
cdb 100% 100% 0% 81.13% 1.89% 96.23%
nstdb 100% 100% 0% 92.86% 35.71% 100%
mitdb 100% 100% 0% 97.83% 47.83% 97.83%
qtdb 99.04% 100% 0% 96.15% 38.46% 100%
stdb 100% 100% 0% 100% 35.71% 100%
cudb 100% 100% 0% 44.44% 11.11% 100%
aami-ec13 80% 100% 0% 50% 10% 60%
svdb 100% 100% 0% 97.87% 42.55% 97.87%
vfdb 83% 100% 0% 17% 6% 94%
szdb 85.71% 100% 0% 85.71% 71.43% 85.71%
slpdb 100% 100% 0% 100% 74.47% 100%
edb 98.89% 100% 0% 98.89% 60% 100%
mghdb 72.28% 100% 0% 59.41% 22.28% 86.14%
apnea-ecg 75.32% 100% 0% 62.34% 29.87% 81.82%
shareedb 95.65% 100% 0% 95.65% 55.52% 100%
Table 2.4: Results of the ENT tests expressed as the percentage of
subjects that pass each test per database.
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Test Name n m or M
Frequency (Monobit) n ≥ 100 -
Frequency Test within a Block - 20 ≤M ≤ n/100
Run n ≥ 100 -
Longest Run of Ones in a Block
Binary Matrix Rank n ≥ 38912 -
Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) n ≥ 1000 -
Non-Overlapping Template Matching 2 ≤ m ≤ 21
Overlapping Template Matching 1 ≤ m ≤ n
Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” 1 ≤ m ≤ n
Linear Complexity n ≥ 106 500 ≤M ≤ 5000
Serial 3 ≤ m ≤ blog2nc − 3
Approximate Entropy m ≤ blog2nc − 6
Cumulative Sums n ≥ 100
Random Excursions n ≥ 106
Random Excursions Variant n ≥ 106
Table 2.5: NIST STS requirements in terms of length [168].
tests to the files (subjects) of each dataset. In this case, we used the
pass criteria included in each test, which are based on an analysis of
the yielded p-values. In other words, p-values of less than 0.01 are
considered to reject. Overall, the results are similar to those obtained
for ENT, although in this case the success rate is generally higher
in most cases. Also, there are substantial differences across datasets.
For instance, iafdb, ptbdb, and twadb obtain success rates higher than
80% in 12, 12, and 11 out of the 15 tests, respectively. Contrarily, the
performance of many datasets is considerably poor, with less than 50%
of their records not passing a majority of the tests: see, for example,
the cases of apnea-ecg and cudb (more than 50% of the records fail 9
out of 15 tests); svdb (more than 50% of the records fail 19 out of 15
tests); edb, slpdb, szdb and vfdb (more than 50% of the records fail
11 out of 15 tests); mghdb (more than 50% of the records fail 12 out
of 15 tests); and lspdb (more than 50% of the records fail 13 out of
15 tests). In the case of slpdb and szdb the results are very deficient,
with all signals in both datasets failing 9 out of the 15 tests (i.e., 0%
of success rate) .
In terms of performance against individual tests, the results are rather
diverse, with a few exceptions. The case of the linear complexity test
stands out, as most datasets exhibit an extremely poor result. This
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suggests the existence of patterns than can be modelled by linear pre-
diction functions, which undoubtedly implies predictability. Similarly,
most datasets perform badly in the monobit and block frequency tests,
which reveals a non-negligible imbalance of zeroes and ones (mono-
bit frequency) and, more generally, all possible M -block bit patterns
(block frequency).
Finally, it is worth noting that there seems to be some correlation
among the tests results, particularly for datasets that do and do not
perform well. Consider, for example, the case of cdb (11/15), iafdb
(13/15), ptdb (13/15), twadb (13/15), and cebsdb (14/15) which ob-
tain extremely good results (at least pass 11 out of 15 tests in the
worst case, i.e., cdb) for all tests. All these databases have in common
that the number of IPIs in median is less than 175—note that an IPI is
made of 4 bits. Contrarily, shareedb (2/15), apnea-ecg (3/15), mghdb
(3/15), edb (4/15), slpdb (4/15), szdb (4/15), and vfdb (4/15) achieve
very poor results (only pass 4 out of 15 in the best case) in the NIST
STS having 46910, 15786, 2426, 4405, 11517, 4439 and 1800 IPIs in
median respectively.
2.4.4 Discussion
In Table 2.7 a summary of all tested databases can be seen with the
typology of each dataset in order to find out some relations between
them. Notice that if we analyze the results in average, all databases
achieve reasonable results in the ENT suite whereas 8 out of 19 pass
the NIST STS tests. Nevertheless, this is not true at all as we can
see in Table 2.4 that none of the tests pass the Chi Square test which
is crucial due to this test checks if the sequence is random or not
[189]. Moreover, the Monte Carlo test achieves 36.45%, i.e., only edb,
shareedb, slpdb and szdb databases pass the Monte Carlo test.
It has been previously pointed out (see Table 2.2) that many authors
only use the mitdb dataset which is true that passes most of the tests
of both suites but not all of them. Thus, it is not a real assumption to
claim that ECG can be considered to be random only by taking the
entropy results. We have proven that a counter achieve similar results
and it is well known that it cannot be used as a random generator
(Table 2.3).
On the one hand, we have run all ENT tests—6 out of 6—to all
databases with different samples per signal of each one of the sub-
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jects, however here we have only focused on mitdb database because
it has been commonly used in the literature. Figure 2.4(a) shows that
when the length of the IPIs (number of bits in the file) is less than
6,000 bits, the probability of being success is less than 0,5 in aver-
age whereas when the length is greater than 6,000 the probability is
between 0.1 and 0.8. Those results corroborate the same results previ-
ously got in Table 2.4 where Chi-Square test achieves a 0% of success
whereas the optimum compression test nearly has a 100% of success.
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Figure 2.4: distribution of the fraction of tests passed for the mitdb
dataset as a function of the number of bits used. (a) ENT suite, and
(b) NIST STS suite.
On the other hand, we have run all NIST STS tests—15 out of 15—to
all databases with different IPIs in median. Nevertheless, similarly to
the ENT experiment, we have only focused on mitdb test instead of
the rest of databases. Contrarily to the results obtained in option a)
in [147], Figure 2.4b shows that when the length of the IPI (number
of bits in the file) increases the results are worse and even when the
length is higher than 7,000 bits, the probability of being successful is
close to 0.5.
After analyzing carefully Table 2.7 where the average of the results
can be seen, we extract the following information:
• When the number of IPIs in median is higher than 1800, then
databases achieve extremely poor results (2 passed tests out of 15
in the worst case) in the NIST STS. Examples of these databases
are vfdb, szdb, slpdb, mghdb, edb, apnea-ecg and shareedb.
• When the number of IPIs in median is between 1800 and 415,
then databases are in the borderline of passing (at least) half
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Dataset ENT NIST STS Avg. No.Samples
Median
(IPI) Pathology
cebsdb 66.6% 93.3% 4,968,780 175 Healthy volunteers
ptbdb 66.6% 86.6% 108,818 68 Myocardial problems and Healthy
controls
twadb 66.6% 86.6% 59,770 87 Myocardial problems
iafdb 66.6% 80.0% 19,707,034 37 Atrial fibrillation or flutter
cdb 66.6% 73.3% 5,120 12 Holter recordings
nstdb 66.6% 66.6% 650,000 1246 Physically active volunteers
mitdb 66.6% 60.0% 650,000 1113 Arrhythmia
qtdb 66.6% 60.0% 224,999 520.5 Holter recordings
stdb 66.6% 46.6% 624,166 1243 Stress tests
cudb 50.0% 40.0% 127,232 415 Ventricular problems
aami-ec13 66.6% 33.3% 55,522 48.5 Tachycardia
svdb 66.6% 33.3% 230,400 1192 Partial epilepsy
vfdb 50.0% 26.6% 525,000 1800 Tachycardia
szdb 83.3% 26.6% 17,245,701 4439 Partial epilepsy
slpdb 83.3% 26.6% 4,188,530 11517 Sleep Apnoea syndrome
edb 83.3% 26.6% 1,800,000 4405 Myocardial and hypertension
mghdb 66.6% 20.0% 1,479,358 2426 Critical Care Units
apnea-ecg 66.6% 20.0% 11,930 15786 Tachycardia
shareedb 83.3% 13.3% 10,553,116 46910 Hypertension
Table 2.7: Characteristics vs. success rate datasets.
of the NIST STS. Examples of these databases are svdb, cudb,
stdb, qtdb, mitdb and nstdb. There is also one exception to this
rule: aami-ec13 which has 48.5 IPIs in median and it achieves a
33.3% (5 passed tests out of 15) which is similar to svdb results.
• When the number of IPIs in median is between 415 and 37, the
databases achieve extremely good results (14 passed tests out
of 15 in the best case) in the NIST STS. Examples of these
databases are cdb, twadb, pbdb, iafdb, cebsdb. As before, there
is an exception to this rule: aami-ec13 which has 48.5 IPIs in
median and it only passes 5 out of 15 tests.
We have tested 19 public databases from the Physionet repository.
This has turned recently a common practice in security proposals and
mitdb has been used as a starting point for authentication and security
based protocols. According to the results presented in this work, we
can claim that mitdb is not the best database for this purpose but
cebsdb. However, other tests such as Diehard was impossible to be
run with these databases because of the length of the signals—Diehard
needs binary files that usually go from 10 to 12 million bytes.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we have addressed the random number generation
issue by using heart signals—in particular, ECG records are used.
Some authors have claimed that the 4 LSBs of the IPI values have
certain entropy level. Despite we have proven they have some entropy
degree, we have also showed that ECG records, and consequently IPI
values derived from them, should not be considered a good source of
randomness only by observing that value. We have used both ENT
and NIST STS test suites to evaluate the randomness property of 19
public and well-known ECG databases and results point to the fact
that IPIs values are not as random as supposed. The database that
achieves better results is cebsdb (healthy volunteers records) instead of
mitdb (arrhythmia record) which is the most common database used
in the literature. The use of cebsdb database seems more appropriate
since users do not suffer any medical condition and no defect (or bias)
is a priory expected in the signals—in addition, the size of the database
is more appropriate.
The results obtained through the conducted in-depth analysis clearly
point two conclusions out: 1) a short burst of bits derived from an
ECG record may seem random, but; 2) large files derived from long
ECG records should not be used for security purposes (e.g., key gen-
eration algorithms). These conclusions should be taken with caution
since these are conditioned to: 1) IPI extraction algorithm described
in Section 2.4.2, and; 2) the 19 public databases studied. Finally, we
highlight here that all the necessary scripts to reproduce our experi-
ments are public available on (https://github.com/aylara/Random_
ECG).
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Feasibility Analysis of
Inter-Pulse Intervals
Based Solutions for
Cryptographic Token
Generation by Two
Electrocardiogram
Sensors
3.1 Introduction
Interest in biometrics has gained momentum in the last years mostly
due to the massive use of daily life devices like smartwatches, smart-
phones and laptops [66, 95]. This technology identifies and authenti-
cates people in an automatic way based on biological and behavioral
traits [191]. This interest is not temporary. According to a recently
published report, global biometric market revenues will reach $34.6
billion annually in 2020, especially in mobile devices [78].
From a technical point of view, biometrics can be classified into two
main groups depending on whether they use physiological or behav-
ioral signals. Examples of physiological signals include fingerprints,
iris, retina, heart and brain signals, whereas voice, signature analysis
or keystroke dynamics are behavioral signals. The main reason why
such signals can be easily included in authentication systems is be-
This chapter is based on this [131] publication
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cause they exhibit a number of desirable features: they are universal,
collectible, unobtrusive, permanent, unique, and difficult to circum-
vent [49].
The research outcome in this area is that most gadgets, such as smart-
phones, tablets, wearables and IMDs, have been equipped with one or
more embedded sensors with the ability to measure biometric param-
eters from the bearer. Besides having biometrics sensors, most (if not
all) of these devices are enhanced with some wireless communication
technology, e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi or Radio Frequency (RF), allowing
them to share data and to perform remote reconfiguration [44]. All
the above has given birth to the so-called WBAN.
Figure 3.1: Two ECG signals from svdb [63] database.
In the last years, several works have focused on using the heart signal
as part of either authentication protocols [144, 147, 162], human identi-
fication [17, 29], or as a key generation algorithm [58, 160, 184, 200] to
enable secure communications. More concretely, authors use the ECG
to extract the time difference between two consecutive heartbeats (R-
peaks). These time intervals are referred to as IPIs or RR-intervals
and have been shown to contain some degree of entropy after applying
a quantization algorithm (see Section 3.3.2.1). This makes the IPI val-
ues an ideal candidate to generate tokens to be used in cryptographic
solutions (e.g., [8, 147, 162, 185, 205]).
In order to obtain a biometric signature based on the heart signal,
different sensors such as ECG, PPG or BP can be used. The ECG
signal is measured using electrodes usually placed on the chest which
detect the tiny electrical changes in the heart and generate a complex
digital signal. The PPG detects the pulse of the heart by measuring
the amount of light which is reflected in the skin to a photodiode. As a
light source, most of the commercial gadgets have a LED on them, e.g.,
smartwatches and sport wrists. As an example on how these advances
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may be used for new purposes, some researchers have recently used
a BP sensor to get the bearer’s heart signal [162]: this sensor can
measure the pressure in large arteries in the systemic circulation, so
the signal reflects the up and down fluctuation of the arterial pressure
which is related to each heartbeat.
Using these sensors is not trivial though, as there are some technical
difficulties due to different factors. For example, even when two similar
sensors—from the same manufacturer, having the same brand, and
with the same capabilities—are measuring the same heart signal in the
same part of the body, the resulting signal would likely be different in
both sensors due to the noise of the signals, missed data during the
gathering phase, delays, or simply because of the bearer’s movements
[158].
Along the same lines, it has been reported in [104] that both HRV
and Inter-Sensor Variability (VARis) measurements directly affect the
processing of the heart signal and, in particular, the peak detection
procedure. These issues become crucial when a cryptographic protocol
entirely relies on biometric data acquisition to generate random tokens,
e.g., random seeds or fresh nonces, to be used for key generation [196]
or in authentication procedures [147].
In particular, the problem of signal synchronization is quite relevant
in the health sector where expensive medical electrodes are used. Let
us consider a real example of measuring ECGs using two different
sensors. Figure 3.1 shows two ECG signals, channel 1 (ECG1) and
channel 2 (ECG2), taken from the public database svdb [63]. This
database is composed of 78 half-hour ECG recordings of supraventric-
ular arrhythmias. The Bits per Minute (bpm) in both signals are the
same, or, in the worst case, show a difference of a few bpm. However,
at low level, the time differences between two consecutive heartbeats
(R-peaks), are slightly different in ECG1 and ECG2. Thus, despite
sensing the same ECG from the same patient, both channels have dif-
ferent signals, and it is easy to see that even by shifting any of the
signals it could not be possible to fully synchronize them.
Authors are somehow aware of this problem and for instance in [158],
a miss-detection algorithm is proposed that given two ECGs, authors
“manually” add a peak in the place where it was supposed to be
whenever it is detected that a peak was missing in order to generate
the same token in different devices. Some years later, in [163], authors
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propose a key-exchange protocol among a Programmer1 and an IMD
where both devices generate the same key from the heart signal. After
gathering the same signal, authors apply a BCH, which is an ECC, to
the generated keys in both devices to finally get the same value.
3.1.1 Our Work
No matter if authentication protocols for WBAN were published [17,
18, 147], if key distribution schemes based on the heart signals were
proposed [144, 163] or whether authors assumed that there is a secure
communication channel and a shared key is derived from the heart
signal to be used afterwards in a cryptographic protocol [36, 158, 162,
200], all these proposals rely on the same assumption: there are two
sensors measuring the heart signal and they can derive the same cryp-
tographic token under an IPI-based approach and after applying an
ECC algorithm like BCH. Unfortunately, after an in depth analysis (19
databases), we show that the above claim does not hold when only an
ECC algorithm is used to correct errors between the two generated
tokens.
Motivated by this, we carry out an analysis on the (open) question
concerning the generation of a cryptographic token based on the anal-
ysis of IPI values from different ECG devices that are sensing the same
heart signal. Our analysis is based on the use of a run-time monitor,
extracted from a formal model, i.e., a timed automaton, that is ver-
ified against predefined properties, combined with a fuzzy extractor
(i.e., an ECC) to improve the final result. We show that it is impos-
sible, in general, to correct the differences between the two captured
signals when using only the fuzzy extractor, thus being impossible to
corroborate previous claims on the feasibility of the approach.
Our proposed method can successfully synchronize two heart signals
through IPI values and extract a common token that can be used
afterwords as part of a cryptographic protocol, as one more security
check in order to proof that both devices are attached to the same
body by proving that they are listening to the same heart signal, i.e.,
they are attached to the same body.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to use a run-
time monitor in combination with a fuzzy extractor. In addition,
to demonstrate the validity of our approach, we provide a large-scale
1Device used to (re)configure IMDs.
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evaluation of the proposed method over 19 public databases containing
heart signals. However, we do not evaluate how good or bad the
IPI-based generated random tokens are from a cryptographic point of
view; we urge the reader to consult [130] for an in-depth analysis of
this issue.
After applying our proposed solution to public databases containing
at least two measurements of heart signals (ECG1 and ECG2), we
conclude that a fuzzy extractor (or another error correction technique)
is not enough to correct the synchronization errors between the IPI
values derived from two ECG signals captured via two sensors placed
on different positions (Section 3.3). In particular, we show that a
pre-processing of the heart signal must be performed before the fuzzy
extractor is applied.
3.1.2 Contributions
In summary, our contributions are:
• We perform an in-depth analysis of the problem of how to syn-
chronize two cryptographic tokens generated by two different
ECG sensors that record the same heart signal and use the IPIs
as the basics for generating the mentioned tokens. We show how
an initial signal pre-processing step is necessary for the error cor-
rection algorithm (e.g., fuzzy extractor) to work properly. Our
results show that it is not possible to assume that two sensors
can derive a common token just by applying an error correction
algorithm without having previously synchronized both signals.
In summary, this first result gives evidence that the assumptions
under which previous IPI-based solutions operate are not correct
and does not guarantee that the same token can be extracted
from two ECGs sensors (Section 3.3.2).
• In order to perform the synchronization (at IPI values level) be-
tween two ECGs sensors, we have generated a run-time monitor
from a timed automaton, which has been verified correct with
respect to predefined timing properties. We compare our results
before and after applying a fuzzy extractor and demonstrate our
improvement in performance (Section 3.3.3).
• We modified our timed automaton and the monitor in order to
extract a token with a given accuracy (namely 32, 64 and 128
bits), in order to gather statistical information on how long it
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would take (median) to get a token with the requested accuracy.
We found that to generate a 32, 64 and 128 bits tokens, a sensor
should wait on median 13, 28 and 56.5 seconds, respectively (for
individual with a heart rate of 80 beats-per-minute), instead
of 6, 12, and 24 seconds as reported in previous works, i.e.,
[17, 124, 147, 195] (Section 3.3.3.2).
• We have developed a proof-of-concept implementation of an ECG-
based token generator by using a BITalino shield2 (Section 3.4).
This shield has two ECG channels connected using wires and
the pre-processing is executed before the token generation (IPI-
based approach in our particular case) takes place. The purpose
of this proof-of-concept is to shed further light on the technical
real difficulties in getting a fully working implementation of such
a solution.
• As it was previously stated, the contributions in this Chapter
shed light on the feasibility of IPI-based solutions, where two
sensors obtain such values from the same organ (in our case the
heart). On the other hand, in this article we do not analyze
the security of IPI values, which has been widely studied in the
literature (e.g., [130, 147, 162, 185]).
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows, in Section 3.2 we
provide some basic knowledge in order to facilitate the reading of
the rest of the Chapter. Section 3.3 presents the core of our work,
while Section 3.4 introduces our proof-of-concept implementation of
the proposed solution. Section 3.5 contains a summary of the main
published papers in this research area. Finally, we conclude in the last
Section.
3.2 Background
In this Section we provide some preliminaries on BANs and we give
a brief overview of the datasets used for the experiments. After this,
we yield an overview of related work that has explored how heart
signals can be applied to biometrics and cryptography. We also discuss
why fuzzy extractors are often used in the literature together with
biometrics. Finally, we give some background about modeling and
verification of real-time systems focusing on how formal verification is
2http://bitalino.com/en/
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used to verify the run-time monitor that we use in to synchronize two
ECG signals.
3.2.1 Body Area Networks
With the recent advances on technology, manufacturers are creating
small and affordable sensors that people can be equipped with in or-
der to acquire different parameters from their vital signs. For in-
stance, athletes usually wear chest band to measure the heart beats
while training or even when they are competing. In the case of el-
derly people, they might be remotely monitored without the need to
be in a medical center. Moreover, nowadays it is common to have
smartwatches or sport gadgets equipped with accelerometers, Global
Positioning System (GPS), and PPG to measure the heart rate. These
devices also have communication modules such as WiFi, Bluetooth or
RF.
When all these gadgets are working together, it is said that they are
part of a Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) (Figure 3.2). That is,
a WBAN is a private network composed of sensors and/or actuators
that measure different vital signs and send this information to a cen-
tral node, typically the bearer’s smartphone—which is assumed to be
trusted—that acts as a gateway between the WBAN and the Internet
[12, 79].
3.2.2 The Physionet Repository
Physionet [57] is a public repository composed of different databases
about physiologic signals of healthy and patients with diseases. The
main purpose of this repository is to allow and encourage researchers
to investigate in the study of diseases and physiologic signals. Specif-
ically, in this work we are only focusing on heart signals and, more
precisely, in those databases with at least two ECG channels. That
being said, popular databases such as fantasia [80] or apnea-ecg [135]
are not considered in our study because there is only one ECG channel
in their records. On the contrary, when more than two ECG signals
are found in the same file, we are taking the first two signals we found
(in a sequential order) in the .hea file which is a special file where the
metadata of the record is stored.
In order to automate the process, we implemented a script to down-
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Database Files Peaks Peaks Heart condition
in ECG1 in ECG2
afdb [55] 23 49003 48294 Atrial fibrillation
afpdb [119] 300 1817 1797 Paroxysmal atrial fibrillation
ahadb [77] 2 8473 8183 Healthy and ventricular ectopy
cebsdb [54] 60 360 360 Healthy
edb [170] 90 8852 881 Myocardial and hypertension
iafdb [139] 32 91 88 Atrial fibrillation or flutter
incartdb [140] 75 2263 2327 Coronary artery disease
ltafdb [138] 84 110632 108205 Paroxysmal
mitdb [120] 48 2204 2227 Arrhythmia
nsrdb [141] 18 99746 10066 No significant arrhythmias
nstdb [122] 15 2556 2544 Mitdb with noise
prcp [122] 10 4310 3355 Healthy
qtdb [96] 105 1044 1044 Holter recordings
sddb [61] 22 25969 36615 Arrhythmia
shareedb [116] 139 95809 95896 Hypertension
slpdb [74] 18 21087 23892 Sleep apnea syndrome
svdb [63] 70 2322 2323 Partial epilepsy
twadb [123] 100 185 184 Myocardial problems
vfdb [62] 22 3457 3457 Tachycardia
Table 3.1: Summary of the databases.
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Figure 3.2: Body Area Network.
load 19 databases from the Physionet repository. A description of the
databases can be seen in Table 3.1 where the number of files represents
the number of patients we used in our experiments. Apart from that,
we computed the average number (median) of R-peaks (heartbeats)
that both the first channel of the ECG (ECG1) and the second chan-
nel of the ECG (ECG2) have. For each database we also included the
heart condition (if any) of the patients.
From that table it is interesting to see that the number of peaks, using
the well-established Pan-Tompkins algorithm for peak detection [183],
is only equal in three databases: cebsdb, qtdb and vfdb whereas the
values are almost equal in the iafdb and twadb databases. All the rest
of the databases (14 out of 19) have different number of peaks.
Finally, Figure 3.3 shows the number of patients that cannot be con-
sidered part of the dataset because they do not reach the minimum
number of IPIs which is 8, 16 and 32 to compute the tokens of 32, 64
and 128 bits respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Deleted patients vs tokens length.
3.2.3 Heart Signals in Cryptography
The use of ECG signals and IPI-based approaches for cryptographic
applications has been widely studied in the literature. Even though
some researchers take more than the 4 LSBs of the IPI to generate
cryptographic tokens, e.g., [137, 143]), the vast majority of the re-
search community, e.g., [7, 8, 17, 34, 136, 147, 158, 160, 162, 169, 185,
200, 205] use the 4 LSBs extracted after applying the quantization al-
gorithm explained in Section 3.3.2.1, or a slight variation of it proven
to contain some degree of entropy. As we try to be as general as pos-
sible, we use the 4 LSBs to generate tokens in our experiments. It
is worth mentioning that although our work is focused on IPI values,
which is the most widely used approach, some authors have proposed
alternative solutions which work in a transform domain (e.g., [58] or
[187]).
In most of the aforementioned IPI-based works it is assumed that
there are two devices listening to the heart signal and they extract a
random token which is used afterwards in a cryptographic protocol.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has performed an in-
depth empirical analysis to check if it is indeed possible to extract a
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common token from the same signal (particularly, the ECG) gathered
from different devices over the same body. Our work aims to fill in
this gap and focused exclusively on IPI-based approaches.
3.2.4 Fuzzy Extractor
Juels and Wattenberg were the first who introduced the term fuzzy
commitment in [84], where a cryptographic key is extracted from a
biometric signal such as an ECG or an EEG. The process of generating
this key is through an algorithm called fuzzy extractor.
Fuzzy extractors are not only applied to key generation protocols
based on biometrics [45, 86, 100] but also for generating keys for au-
thentication purposes, by using Physical Unconlable Functions (PUFs)
[70, 155], and for key generation in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networkss (VANETs)
[102].
Formally, a fuzzy extractor is a function f which takes as input a bio-
metric signal w, and produces a random string R and a public param-
eter P . Fuzzy extractors are particularly suitable for cryptographic
protocols because when the input w′ changes slightly, i.e., w′ = w + 
for a very small , the random output R remains invariant [46].
Generation
R
W Reproduction
P
W’
R
Figure 3.4: Scheme of fuzzy extractor [126].
Typically, a fuzzy extractor is composed of two main phases: gener-
ation and reproduction [46]. As it can be seen in Figure 3.4, in the
generation phase, a biometric signal w is received as input and two
parameters are given as output: a secret value R and a public value
P . In the reproduction phase, a fresh biometric signal w′ is given
as input together with the public parameter P , previously generated
in the generation phase. If and only if the distance between these
two biometric signals—typically the Hamming distance—is less than
a given threshold tr (Hamming(w,w′) < tr), then the same output R
will be retrieved.
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3.2.5 Modelling and Verification of Real-Time Sys-
tems
Our application is a typical example of a real-time system, where a
number of real-time constraints must be satisfied. Our proposed solu-
tion is based on the satisfaction of three important real-time properties
concerning: i) the time between two consecutive peaks of each ECG
signal; ii) the relative time between peaks from the different heart sig-
nals; iii) the total sampling time to return back a valid token. Note
that this final requirement is to force the algorithm to finish its exe-
cution after a fixed time. We give some upper-bounds of these times
in Section 3.3.3.2.
The design, reasoning and implementation of real-time systems have
been addressed by different communities, in particular by formal meth-
ods researchers and more specifically those concerned with real-time
verification [10]. In that community, the idea is to make an abstract
model to represent the real-time system or some specific time con-
straints of the system, and apply tools to increase the confidence that
the model satisfies some properties. One of the most broadly used
formalism to model real-time systems is timed automata [9], for which
reasonable mature tools have been developed to reason about, e.g.,
UPPAAL [21] and KRONOS [25]. In those tools, one specifies the
model as a timed automata and writes properties about it on a real-
time logic called Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) [11].
The idea is that after performing such verification on the model, one
may then write an implementation by taking the timed automaton as
a starting point. Depending on the abstraction level of the model,
the implementation might be more or less difficult to obtain. Though
there is a gap between the model and the implementation, and errors
might be introduced when an implementation is obtained from the
model, it is clearly an advantage to have a verified model in the first
place. As we will see later, in our case the implementation is directly
obtained from the model, which gives us quite a high confidence on
the correctness of our solution with respect to the specified timing
constraints.
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3.3 ECG-Based Token Generation Pro-
cedure
In this Section, we first explain the methodology we have followed
to carry out our research. We then explain in detail how we gen-
erated tokens from different ECG signals, and demonstrate how a
pre-processing phase is needed to agree on the same token generated.
Finally, we propose a timed automaton satisfying our properties and
create the corresponding monitor in order to synchronize the signals
(and thus generate the same token).
3.3.1 Our Methodology
All the experiments presented in this section were run on a Macbook
Pro 2.4Ghz with 4Gb of RAM. The processing of all the patients’
signals were implemented on Matlab.
We analyze all the performed experiments and discuss the results ob-
tained after generating two tokens independently (emulating differ-
ent sensors) in 4 scenarios: 1. running a quantization algorithm (Sec-
tion 3.3.2.1); 2. running a fuzzy extractor algorithm (Section 3.3.2.2);
3. running a run-time monitor (Section 3.3.3.1), and; 4. running a
run-time monitor and a fuzzy extractor algorithm (Section 3.3.3.2).
Finally, from our results we conclude that synchronization of the sig-
nals is a must if we want the sensors to derive the same token from
the ECG signal.
Regarding the run-time monitor, two specific values need to be com-
puted beforehand: the time between two consecutive peaks from both
the same ECG channel and from different channels. To generate an
upper-bound of those values with statistical significance, we require
the person to be quite and calm. However, due to the fact that we are
using the Physionet repository with all the signals already measured,
we decided to use the mean of the time interval between R-peaks of
each one of the signals as an upper-bound which is a common tech-
nique used in medical research [175]. Additionally, we set the maxi-
mum time between consecutive peaks for different signals in the case
of Physionet repository to 1fs where fs is the reading frequency of the
device where the signal is gathered. This is due to the fact that this
parameter is determined by the physical distance between sensors and
in the case of the Physionet databases, all the patients were monitored
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using wired ECG sensors attached to their chest.
Having computed those numbers, we have verified three main proper-
ties: i) the time between two consecutive peaks of each ECG signal;
ii) the relative time between peaks from the different heart signals,
and; iii) the total sampling time. Similarly [158], we consider that
when the time interval between two consecutive peaks from the same
signal is longer than the computed upper-bound, then the monitor
resets its clocks and considers that there a miss-detected peak was
found. Also, when the time interval between two consecutive peaks
from different signals is longer than 1fs then the monitor resets its
clocks and considers that those peaks are not synchronized. Finally,
we have proved that after t seconds, the final state is always reached
and if and only if there are enough synchronized IPI then a token is
computed.
3.3.2 Debunking ECG-Based Token Generation
Myths
3.3.2.1 Token Generation Algorithm
Our first experiment goal was to generate as many tokens of 128 bits
as possible from both channels (ECG1 and ECG2) of the patients of
all the databases to know how different they are. In order to process
the ECG signal—which is a continuous signal, it must be transformed
to a discrete one. This process is known as quantization (e.g., uniform
or dynamic quantization) and it is one of the most important steps in
the token generation based on heart signals [26].
As far as we know, in the context of ECG IPI-based approaches, the
dynamic quantization firstly proposed by Rostami et al. in [147] is the
most extended in the literature. In a nutshell, their algorithm works
as follows. First, the ECG signal is cleaned (i.e., the DC compo-
nent is eliminated and then the ECG signal is passed through a pass-
band filter with 0.67Hz and 45Hz cut-off frequencies [27]). Second,
R-peaks are extracted from the heart signal by using Pan-Tompkins
algorithm [132] and the time difference between R-peaks are com-
puted and thus, the IPIs are generated. Third, the IPIs values are
dynamically transformed into values between 0 and 1. Then the data
are multiplied by 256 and rounded to the nearest integer. Finally,
the Gray code encoding scheme with 8-bit of precision is used to fa-
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cilitate error correction and the 4 LSBs of each IPIs are extracted
to generate a token. This token is computed by appending these 4
LSBs [8, 205]; in order to create a 128-bit number at least 32 IPIs
should be processed. The source code of the dynamic quantization
is freely available at https://github.com/aylara/synchro (i.e., see
getIPIsSignal.m file).
The pseudocode of the aforementioned IPI extraction algorithm, which
is also used in this Chapter to process the signal and extract the 4 LSBs
of the IPIs, is shown as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 IPIs’ extraction.
1: procedure IPIgeneration(record)
2: signal ← get_signal(record)
3: freq ← get_sampling_frequency(record)
4: cleaned_signal ← ECG_pre-processing(record)
5: IPIs ← Pan_Tompkins(cleaned_signal,freq)
6: IPIs ← dynamic_quantization(IPIs)
7: result ← [ ]
8: for ipi ∈ IPIs do
9: grey← grey_code(ipi)
10: IPINEW ← get_LSB(gray)
11: result.append(IPINEW)
12: return result
As mentioned before, we generate as many 128 bits tokens as possible
per user per database and the result of this analysis can be seen in
the second column of Table 3.2. Note that this column contains the
sum of all the tokens extracted per database for only one channel
(ECG1 or ECG2). Also, we computed how many of these tokens are
similar by calculating the Hamming distance between each pair of
tokens from both channels (ECG1 and ECG2) before performing any
signal processing and compared them pairwise. The results can be
seen in the third column of Table 3.2. It is interesting to see that
the number of similar tokens is extremely low in all databases which
means that the output of the quantization algorithm cannot directly
be used to generate similar tokens in different devices.
As a conclusion, we corroborate our claim that just applying an IPI
extraction algorithm like the one presented in Algorithm 1) composed
of the Pan-Tompkins algorithm plus a dynamic quantization to gen-
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DB Tokens Similar Similar Tokens Similar Similar tokens
(Alg 1) tokens tokens (FE) (RM) tokens (RM) (RM+FE)
afdb 35690 8 (0.02%) 77 (0.2%) 1549 (%) 847 (54.6%) 1495 (96.5%)
afpdb 14505 40 (0.27%) 740 (5.1%) 9251 (%) 45 (0.48%) 1196 (12.9%)
ahadb 511 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 15 (%) 2 (13.3%) 14 (93.3%)
cebsdb 2577 2 (0.07%) 1360 (52.7%) 839 (%) 59 (7.0%) 835 (99.5%)
edb 24262 21 (0.08%) 497 (2.0%) 3769 (%) 1995 (52.9%) 3706 (98.3%)
iafdb 207 0 (0%) 34 (16.4%) 23 (%) 11 (47.8%) 23 (100%)
incartdb 5127 0 (0%) 69 (1.3%) 1117 (%) 4 (0.3%) 241 (21.5%)
ltafdb 271605 185 (0.06%) 1188 (0.4%) 21337(%) 92 (0.4%) 870 (4.0%)
mitdb 3198 0 (0%) 45 (1.4%) 770 (%) 0 (0%) 110 (14.2%)
nsrdb 52290 1980 (3.7%) 4072 (7.7%) 13965(%) 26 (0.1%) 1176 (8.4%)
nstdb 1160 0 (0%) 8 (0.6%) 171 (%) 0 (0%) 25 (14.6%)
prcp 825 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 22 (%) 2 (9.0%) 20 (90.9%)
qtdb 3413 1 (%) 216 (6.3%) 1346 (%) 695 (51.6%) 1315 (97.6%)
sddb 21280 1212 (5.6%) 1732 (8.1%) 1364 (%) 572 (41.9%) 1029 (75.4%)
shareedb 405775 2638 (0.6%) 4758 (1.1%) 60440(%) 297 (0.4%) 3229 (5.3%)
slpdb 8860 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 172 (%) 27 (15.6%) 169 (98.2%)
svdb 5710 2 (0.03%) 105 (1.8%) 2984 (%) 9 (0.3%) 315 (10.5%)
twadb 528 0 (0%) 31 (5.8%) 204 (%) 107(52.4%) 203 (99.5%)
vfdb 2144 0 (0%) 49 (2.2%) 221 (%) 93 (42.0%) 216 (97.7%)
Table 3.2: Number of tokens of 128-bit tokens generated by Algo-
rithm 1 (column 2); Number of similar tokens after running Algo-
rithm 1 (column 3); Number of similar tokens after running Algo-
rithm 1 + Fuzzy Extractor (FE) (column 4); Number of tokens after
running Algorithm 1 + Run-time Monitor (RM) (column 5); Num-
ber of similar tokens after running Algorithm 1 + Run-time Monitor
(RM) (column 6); Number of similar tokens after running Algorithm 1
+ Run-time Monitor + Fuzzy Extractor (RM+FE) (column 7).
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Figure 3.5: Fuzzy extractor.
erate tokens is not enough to guarantee that the same token will be
generated in two different sensors.
3.3.2.2 Fuzzy Extractor
Following the scheme presented in [86], we implemented a fuzzy ex-
tractor algorithm, which was specifically adapted to work with ECG
signals. The scheme of the fuzzy extractor can be seen in Figure 3.5.
The fuzzy extractor takes as input two ECG signals (ECG1 and ECG2)
and two random numbers (PRNG1 and PRNG2). The ECG1 and the
mentioned random numbers are provided in the generation phase since
they are needed in the computation of the Helper Data (i.e., (s, x)),
which is used in the reproduction phase together the ECG2 signal.
The result of the fuzzy extractor is a pair of identical values R. Our
fuzzy extractor is publicly available at https://github.com/aylara/
synchro (i.e., see simulation_fuzzyextractor.m file).
We assign the following values for the parameters m, n, k and t of
the BCH: m = 7, n = 127, k = 50, t = 13), following the guidelines
given in [86].The parameter t = 13 represents a trade-off between the
correction capability and the the ability the adversary has to break
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the protocol. Thus this parameter should not be increased arbitrarily
since it would increase the success probability of an adversary. This
means that the BCH can recover at most 13 different bits from words
of 128 bits (i.e., a 10% of the bits). We urge the reader to consult [67]
for a detailed description of BCH parameters and their implications.
An additional argument for this 10% value (t = 13) is that we have
empirically demonstrated that is not possible to achieve 90% of simi-
larity in the tokens generated without our run-time monitor together
with the fuzzy extractor (see columns 3 and 4 from Table 3.2).
In order to check how the fuzzy extractor behaves, we used the out-
put of the Algorithm 1 as input of the fuzzy extractor and computed
the Hamming distance between each pair of tokens compared tokens
pairwise and the results can be seen in the third column of Table 3.2.
Even if our fuzzy extractor produces a slight improvement, with re-
spect to the results obtained without performing any pre-processing of
the signal (see column 2), the results are far from being the expected
ones. For instance, the cebsdb database which achieves a 52.7% of
the similar tokens in both channels is not a good result, i.e., 1 out
of 2 generated tokens is random. The reason for getting these poor
results stems from the fact that the distance between the IPIs calcu-
lated from each sensor clearly exceeds the correction capacity of the
fuzzy extractor (BCH encoder). In our experimentation, for words of
128 bits the correction capacity is set to t = 13.
3.3.3 How to Generate ECG-Based Tokens
3.3.3.1 Timed Automata
Timed automata are composed of five main parts: clocks, time-checks,
actions, events and states. For our timed automaton, we have defined
three different clocks, namely c1, c2 and c3, which are in charge of
checking the time properties of the heart beats in our model. Con-
cretely, c1 checks an upper bound for the execution of the automaton,
that is, how long the automaton should be executed; c2 checks when
the peaks from both signals are synchronized or not, and; c3 checks
when there are missed peaks in the same signal.
All the time checks used in the automaton were obtained after having
analyzed all databases. We show in Figure 3.6 a representation of
these time checks. More concretely:
tc This value varies in time and between each person. In order
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Figure 3.6: Time-checks used in the timed automaton.
to compute tc, as stated in Section 3.3.1, the person should be
in a quite and peaceful environment. For our experiments and
following the similar technique proposed in [175], we calculated
the mean time between R-peaks of each pair of ECGs (ECG1
and ECG2), which is the value assigned to the time-check tc.
tm This value is determined by the physical distance between sen-
sors and hence, it is directly affected by the speed of the blood
pumped from the heart to the rest of the body. In our partic-
ular case, all the databases of the Physionet repository always
consider electrodes attached to the chest of the patients, so we
forced this value to be less than 1fs where fs is the sampling rate.
So, tm < tc, otherwise a missed peak is detected and discarded
by the automaton.
ts This value is a bound that determines how long each “session”
of the execution of the monitor should be. We set this value to
be equal to the longest signal encountered in our databases, in
order to ensure we consider all the signals.
Table 3.3 shows all the variables and constants of our automaton
(shown in Figure 3.7), defined as a tuple A = {L,X,Σ,∆, F}, where:
• L = {E0, E1, E2, E3, E4} is the set of locations (with E0 and E4
the initial and final states, respectively);
• Σ = {Log,Reset,ReturnPeaks, Sync} are all the actions;
• X = {c1, c2, c3} is the set of clocks;
• ∆ ⊆ L×X×Σ×2X×L is the transition relation, where F ⊆ L
is a set of accepting locations.
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c1, c2, c3 := 0
✏|[c1   ts]! ReturnPeaks
✏|[c1 < ts]! Reset(c3)
PeakECG1 |[c3  tc & c1  ts]! Reset(c2, c3)
PeakECG2 |[c2  tm]! Sync
PeakECG1 |[c2  tm]! Sync✏|[c2 > tm]! Log(PeakECG2)
✏|[c2 > tm]! Log(PeakECG1)
✏|[c1   ts]! ReturnPeaks
✏|[c1   ts]! ReturnPeaks
✏|[c1   ts]! ReturnPeaks
PeakECG2 |[c3  tc & c1  ts]! Reset(c2, c3)
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Figure 3.7: Heart based timed automaton.
The Log action keeps a list of those IPIs which are not synchronized
according to our time constraints. Reset initializes the clocks given as
input. ReturnPeaks returns the list of non-synchronized IPIs. Finally,
the Sync action computes the list of IPIs which are synchronized.
Regarding the events, we have two types: when a peak comes from
the ECG1 or from the ECG2. Additionally, we have defined  which
means that we do not wait for any event to occur and we force the
runtime monitor to check if the condition is satisfied to perform the
transition to the corresponding state.
The automaton has 5 states. All the clocks and variables are set to 0 in
the initial state E0. Note that whenever c1 ≥ ts then the computation
finishes (the automaton is in state E4). The rest are intermediate
states, ensuring progress in the computation provided the relevant
timing constraints are respected (“accepting” or “rejecting” peaks).
We implemented our timed automaton in Uppaal [21], allowing us to
validate and verify our model in a formal way. Our verified model was
then translated into a runtime monitor implemented as Matlab code.
The source code of both implementations are available at https://
github.com/aylara/synchro (i.e., see Automaton and UPAAL folders).
We tested our generated runtime monitor with the output of the Al-
gorithm 1. The number of tokens has decreased considerably as it can
be seen in the fifth column of Table 3.2. After that, we then computed
the Hamming distance between each pair of tokens compared pairwise
and the results can be seen in the sixth column of Table 3.2. Note that,
in general, the number of similar tokens has increased considerably af-
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Clocks
c1 Sampling time
c2 Time between peaks of two signals
c3 Time between two consecutive peaks (same signal)
Time-checks
tc Time between two consecutive peaks (same signal)
tm Time between peaks of two signals
ts Sampling time
Actions
Log Stores those IPIs which are not synchronized
Reset Initializes the clocks given as input
ReturnPeaks Returns the non-synchronized IPI set
Sync Checks what IPIs are synchronized
Events
PeakECGx R-Peak of ECGx, where x ∈ [1, 2]
 No event
States
E0 Initial state
E1 When a peak of the first signal is detected
E2 When a peak of the second signal is detected
E3 When one peak of each signal is detected
E4 When the max time is detected (c1 ≥ ts)
Table 3.3: Properties of the automaton (Figure 3.7).
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ter running the run-time monitor with respect to the third column.
However, this improvement does not come for free. The penalty we
have to pay is that the number of tokens has decreased per database
as it can be seen in fifth column of such a Table.
3.3.3.2 Timed Automaton & Fuzzy Extractor
As already explained, our approach consists of combining our monitor
(extracted from our verified timed automaton, for synchronizing the
tokens (based on IPI values) extracted from two different ECG signals)
and the fuzzy extractor (to correct some bits).
The results can be seen in the last column of Table 3.2. After applying
this solution we can successfully generate the same token from different
sensors with high probability in the majority of the databases, i.e., 10
out of 19 databases have a probability higher than 90% of taking
two similar tokens generated on different sensors. However, despite of
our method improves the current state of the art, it will remains low
for 8 databases, namely afpdb, incartdb, ltafdb, mitdb, nsrdb, nstdb,
shareedb and svdb whereas sddb achieves a 75.4% of probability that
two arbitrary tokens be similar.
From the above results, we can clearly conclude that the best databases
to be used to extract cryptographic tokens are the ones with healthy
patients. Moreover, our method seems to work reasonably well with
those patients whose disease is not severe. Hence, we recommend not
to use databases such as mitdb which is widely used in the research
community for security purposes [14, 143, 147, 158, 206] or nsrdb
[204, 205] to mention a few.
Having empirically demonstrated the effectiveness of our proposed
method, the only question that remains uncovered yet is how long
the run-time monitor needs to listen to the heart signal in order to
obtain a token which can be used later on as part of a cryptographic
protocol.
We conducted an additional experiment to measure how long the run-
time monitor needs to keep listening an ECG signal in order to produce
a token of 1. 32 bits (Figure 3.8); 2. 64 bits (Figure 3.9), and; 3. 128
bits (Figure 3.10). To carry out this test, we modified the original
timed automaton (Figure 3.7) in such a way that, instead of having 3
different clocks (c1, c2 and c3), we only keep c2 and c3, and replace c1
by a counter. By doing so, as soon as the automaton detects that the
length of the token is 32, 64 or 128 respectively, then the final state E4
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Figure 3.8: Time needed to generate a 32-bit token.
is reached. Roughly speaking, taking into account that we can only
extract the 4 LSBs from an IPI, the automaton will stop when it finds
8, 16 or 32 synchronized IPIs. We have then re-implemented our new
automaton in Matlab, getting a new monitor.
Furthermore, in order to make Figures 3.8 to 3.10 more readable,
we decided to discard some of the outliers and we kept the 70% of
the original data. It can be observed that, in order to get a 32-bit
token, sensors need to listen approximately for 13 seconds on median.
Similarly, to get a 64-bit or 128-bit token, they should listen the ECG
for 28 and 56.5 seconds, respectively, on median. It is also noticeable
that although at a first sight the above mentioned timing values might
appear to be excessive, this generation process will only be executed
once, typically in the setup phase of the cryptographic protocol (e.g.,
key generation and synchronization processes between two sensors).
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Figure 3.9: Time needed to generate a 64-bit token.
Figure 3.10: Time needed to generate a 128-bit token.
66
3. Feasibility Analysis of IPI Based Solutions
3.4 Proposed Solution
In this Section we provide a proof-of-concept implementation to demon-
strate whether two sensors can derive the same token from the heart
signal using real hardware. The purpose of the presented proof-of-
concept is to show the feasibility of our solution as well as the min-
imum requirements for generating common tokens on different ECG
sensors. For this first approach, and similarly to previous proposals
(e.g., [154, 163, 202]), we assume the communications to be secure be-
tween the sensors and the gateway (at least during the set-up phase).
Alternatively, we could have used noisy cryptography [177] to share
sensitive information (the two ECGs in our particular case) via inse-
cure channels.
A real example in which the above scenario can occur is as follows.
Imagine that Alice is wearing a smart T-shirt with an ECG monitor
similar to the one proposed in [194]. This T-shirt is already paired
with her smartphone which makes the communication channel secure.
Additionally, she has a pacemaker which is as well paired with the
smartphone. In this scenario, the smartphone is acting as a WBAN
gateway due to its computational resources in terms of CPU, storage,
memory and communication capabilities. The above example is inte-
grated within what is called body area networks. Another example,
perhaps more futurist and within the area of the intelligent and con-
nected cars could be the following. A driver (Bob) holds a smart-watch
with an ECG sensor—note that this type of product is already on the
market [31]. As for the car, the steering wheel, and as a novelty, also
has an ECG sensor [32, 156]. As in the above example, both ECG
sensors are securely connected to the car’s central control system that
acts as gateway. The two described examples are completely different
but in both scenarios the two sensors must calculate the same crypto-
graphic token (derived from the ECG recorded by each sensor) with
the help of the gateway.
Summarizing, our system has three entities: a gateway and two ECG
sensors (e.g., smart T-shirt and pacemaker).3 Figure 3.11 provides
an architectural view of the system. Once the ECGs signals have
been gathered by the sensors, they are sent to the gateway in order
to be synchronized by using the timed-automation (see Section 3.3.3.1
and Figure 3.7). After that, the already synchronized signals are sent
3Note that it could have also been possible to use one of the sensors as a gateway.
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Figure 3.11: System model using both a timed automaton and a
fuzzy extractor.
back to the sensors, the peak extractor procedure (Algorithm 1) is
executed to extract the tokens, and finally the fuzzy extractor (see
Section 3.3.2.2 and Figure 3.5) is applied to the processed signals in
order to generate the same cryptographic token.
We have basically deployed the scheme presented in Figure 3.11 by us-
ing a low-cost hardware dedicated for research purposes named BITal-
ino4. This shield has two ECG channels and a Bluetooth connection.
As in the Alice example, we had to pair our hardware with the gateway
which, in our case, was a laptop as can be seen in Figure 3.12.
More concretely, it works as follows: 1) First, sensors measure the
heart signal and send the gathered ECGs to the gateway via a secure
communication channel. Once the signal is received by the gateway,
the run-time monitor is executed in order to synchronize both signals.
4http://bitalino.com/en/
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Figure 3.12: Proof-of-concept based on the BITalino platform.
2) After the signals are synchronized, the sensors receive the position
of the peaks that must be removed by the gateway. For this commu-
nication to occur a secure channel is also needed. 3) When the the
list of peaks to be removed is received, the sensors proceed to delete
them—note that at this point both signals are synchronized in terms
of R-peaks—in order to proceed with the token generation. 4) Finally,
a fuzzy extractor is applied to the processed signal in order to generate
the same token. The helper data can be transmitted from one sensor
(generation process) to the other one (reproduction process) without
the necessity of a secure channel.
It is worth mentioning that the gateway cannot generate a token by
itself to be used in the WBAN; its role is to synchronize the signal and
thus helping the sensors to generate a shared token. However, at the
end of this protocol, not only the sensors can generate the same token
but also the gateway may do it. The source code of our implementation
can be downloaded from https://github.com/aylara/synchro.
3.4.1 Security Analysis
In order to solve the problem of creating the same token in two sensors,
two aspects need to be addressed: i) a secure communication channel
(sensor(s)–gateway) must be used, and; ii) sensors have to share their
gathered ECGs with the gateway to synchronize them.
Traditionally, authors have assumed that different sensors can extract
the same token by measuring the same signal from an organ (in our
case the heart). Most authors rely on the fact that, in order to derive
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the same token, the (active) attacker must be reading the ECG of
the bearer at the same time as the devices are and such probability
is almost negligible [198]. On the other hand, other proposals (e.g.,
[147, 158]) assumed that the communication can only be established
if the devices are close enough (commonly named as neighborhood
area): the attacker should be a few centimeters from them and would
be easily detected. In these security protocols, the ECG is used to
derive a common secret between different sensors and thus, the ECG
can be considered as the secret key. The signal must therefore be
transmitted over a secure communication channel.
A more recent approach was presented in [154]. In this work, authors
use the ECG to securely distribute symmetric cryptographic keys.
However, authors use a trusted central node in charge of establishing a
secure communication between sensors that want to share some data.
In this approach all the devices (two sensors and the gateway) are
on the body as they need to record the ECG at the same time and
by themselves—in our case only the two sensors have to collect the
ECG signal—and the secure channel is established by using a fuzzy
commitment scheme [84]. In this Chapter, we demonstrated that only
by using a fuzzy commitment scheme is not enough to generate the
same token in different devices. In [154] and our proposal, once the
cryptographic token synchronized between the sensors is established,
they can exchange information directly without involving anyone else.
For instance, after the setup phase, smart-watches, wrist-bands and
IMD can securely exchange data with each other regardless of the
brand, manufacturer or the purpose of the device.
It is important to note that our proof-of-concept implementation is
secure if and only if the communication channel between the sensors
and the gateway is secure (like most of the proposed solutions in this
field). This is because both sensors are sending the ECG to the gate-
way and thus, an attacker (A) can sniff the communication channel,
extract the signals and perform the matching operation. The only
extra information that A would need is the specific instant the tokens
have started to be computed. It is also remarkable that the secure
channel requirement is only used for the very first time (set-up phase
of the protocol); once the two ECG signals are synchronized, there is
no longer any need to keep the channel secure.
In this Chapter we empirically demonstrated that the assumption of
two sensors deriving the same token from the heart (ECG signal), is at
70
3. Feasibility Analysis of IPI Based Solutions
least questionable. We showed that, in addition to the error correction
techniques, a new step is needed before extracting such a token: the
synchronization of the signal. To achieve this, there are two options:
1) one of the sensors sends the ECG to the other one in order to syn-
chronize the signal and the latter sends the synchronized signal back to
the first one, or; 2) a trusted and external party is used to synchronize
the signal and communicate the final decision to the sensors. Either
way, the main consequence from a security point of view is that now
Eve—a passive attacker, just by eavesdropping on the communication
channel might synchronize both ECG signals and extract a common
key. To combat this we proposed two main approaches: 1) assume a
secure channel in the set-up phased, or; 2) assume that the channel
is insecure all the time and use some protection mechanism such as
solutions based on noisy cryptography [177].
3.5 Related work
Several studies have been done in the area of security and privacy ap-
plied to biometrics, and in particular where heart signals are involved
(e.g., [144, 147, 205]] In most of these works, there are three main as-
sumptions: 1) bits extracted from the heart signal can be considered
random [147, 162]; 2) two sensors placed in the same body can generate
the same random token from the heart signal [17, 158, 185, 206], and;
3) two sensors should gather 32 consecutive peaks in order to generate
a 128 bits nonce which is approximately a 32 seconds signal [200, 205].
As far as we are concerned, this work is the first one that empirically
demonstrates that the usual assumptions made in the aforementioned
papers regarding the token generation in different devices at the same
time are at least questionable.
On the one hand, it is usually assumed that the random numbers
derived from IPIs can be directly used on cryptographic applications
because of the high entropy degree that the 4 LSBs have. Addition-
ally, some researchers have tried to improve the strength of the entropy
per IPI in order to guarantee a higher security level [160, 162, 185].
However, Ortiz et al. questioned the entropy quality of the IPI val-
ues and the dependence of the results on the dataset used [130]. In
this Chapter, the involvement of the two sensors is necessary because
thanks to this (and the acquisition of the same IPI values derived from
the recorded ECGs) they mutually verify they are close to each other
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(i.e., that they are in the neighbourhood area as is commonly named in
distance bounding protocols) and additionally they can authenticate
each other. Therefore, this kind of distance checking (and mutual au-
thentication if necessary) is made by the participation of both sensors
(on the same organ).
On the other hand, researchers have usually assumed that a person
equipped with different heart sensors can extract the same nonce from
the ECG by using a fuzzy extractor (see [204] for a comparison between
fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault schemes). For example, authors in
[147] propose a security protocol where a patient equipped with an
IMD and a doctor with a Programmer can extract the same nonce
from the patient’s ECG. Similar assumptions are made in [144, 195,
206], just to cite a few of them. Contrarily to any prior proposals, in
this Chapter we demonstrated that error correction algorithms, such
as fuzzy extractors, are not enough to claim that sensors placed in
different parts of the body can generate the same token using an IPI-
based approach.
Recently, some authors have taken into account that some events may
occur during the measurement process that increase the difference
between the generated tokens. For instance, it is possible that noise
appear in the extraction of the signal and the detection of heart peaks
will be affected [158]. Because of that, [158] proposes a mechanism to
statistically calculate where a peak should be in the ECG signal and
they manually add it so that the entropy degree is not affected. Also,
other parameters such as HRV and VARis can alter the peak detection
algorithm [104] and they must be taken into account to ensure that
the keys are equal enough. In this Chapter, we not only take those
issues into consideration but also the heart signal is never modified so
that other computations can be applied over the signal such as medical
checks of the heart.
Finally, it was stated in [17, 124, 147, 195], that sensors have to keep
listening the ECG for about 30 seconds to generate a 128 bits token. In
our work we have proved that in order to generate a 128 bits token, two
sensors should be reading the heart signal for almost 1 minute (56.6
seconds) on median, time which we have obtained experimentally and
it is in general much larger that it was previously claimed.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter we tested whether error corrections algorithms, in-
cluding fuzzy extractors, can be used alone to claim that two different
sensors are able to derive equal tokens from two ECG signals mea-
sured at different parts of the body by using an IPI-based approach
as proposed in many previous works [17, 147, 160, 162, 195]. We run
the experiments against 19 public databases from Physionet reposi-
tory, and we can clearly conclude that a pre-processing of the heart
signal is mandatory for generating the same token. Because of that,
we proposed a run-time monitor, based on a timed automaton, to
synchronize both ECG signals before the peaks are computed and be-
fore the fuzzy extractor takes place. Finally, we run once again the
same experiments and errors are reduced to zero in many of the tested
databases.
Additionally, we also conducted one more experiment to check how
long the sensors should record the heart signal in order to generate
tokens of 32, 64 and 128 bits and, contrarily to what it is usually
assumed (6, 12, and 24 seconds for individual with a heart rate of 80
bpm), the sensors have to wait 13, 28 and 56.5 seconds on median
respectively to derive the same token from two ECG sensors.
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4
Are the Interpulse
Intervals of an ECG
Signal a Good Source of
Entropy? An In-depth
Entropy Analysis Based
on NIST 800-90B
Recommendation
4.1 Introduction
In the last years, a new way of generating and distributing secret
tokens based on the heart signal has gained more and more popularity
among security researchers [14, 58]. It can be seen how since the first
paper appeared in 2004, proposing that the heart signal might be
applied to cryptography [18], several proposals have been published in
the literature.
In brief, the heart signal—which is a continuous signal—is gathered by
some sensors, and it is transformed into a discrete signal. This process
is known as quantization. While the first algorithm was introduced by
Bao et al. [18] and later improved by Xu et al. [195] in 2011, the most
common one was proposed by Rostami et al. [147] two years later
based on the previous ones. After then, many authors have used such
quantization algorithm [8, 91, 159, 161] or a slight modification of it
[88] to extract a subset of the LSBs from each Inter-Pulse Interval
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(IPI) (i.e., time interval between two R-peaks or heartbeats) due to
its claimed entropy property [147].
In a vast majority of the literature, authors rely either directly or
indirectly—by referencing other papers, on the fact that the heart
signal contains entropy and thus, it might be used in key genera-
tion procedures [159, 88], authentication protocols [147, 186, 22] or
peak misdetection algorithms [91, 157]. There is, however, a standard
methodology in all these works based on IPI values: the length of the
generated token is given by appending as many bits (typically the four
LSBs per IPI) as the protocol needs. On the contrary, some authors
do not follow this line but claim that the Most Significant Bit (MSB)
of the IPIs do not have entropy [143]. In this paper, we will demon-
strate that MSBs should also be taken into account to generate tokens
with entropy.
When authors check the entropy of the generated tokens, there is a
subset of them who specifically claim to use the Shannon entropy
[8, 159, 161, 142]. On the contrary, there are others who just say that
they test the entropy, providing no more information [93, 88] or even
there are some authors who directly do not check the entropy but run
some random test instead like the NIST STS [17, 71, 201] which, as
Rushanan et al. [149] pointed out, is not enough to claim that the
ECG can be a good source of entropy.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, some questions have not
been tackled in the literature so far. 1) Are the four LSBs the best ones
to create the best token from the entropy point of view? 2) Are there
any other possible combinations of bits that achieve more entropy than
taken the four LSBs? How good they are concerning the four LSBs,
and; 3) Is the ECG a source of entropy?
In this article, we answer these questions and demonstrate that only by
looking at the Shannon entropy is not enough for the heart signal—and
particularly for the IPI values from the ECG signal—to be considered
a source of entropy.
4.1.1 Overview of Our Results
In this work, we analyze the entropy of the LSB values extracted from a
heart signal according to the NIST STS recommendation (i.e., SP 800-
90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation [176]). To facilitate the replication of our results by other
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researchers, we downloaded and used 19 databases from the Physionet
public repository1 [57]. Our contributions can be summarized as:
• We test 19 databases with information about heart signals from
different people. All datasets are taken from the Physionet pub-
lic repository, which contains heart signals from both healthy
volunteers and people with cardiac conditions.
• Contrarily to prior proposals, we demonstrate that the four
LSB are not the best bits to be used in cryptographic appli-
cations. We generate all the variation without repetition of 8
bits taken from [2,...,5] bits and extract the best combination
of bits—combination(s) which achieve(s) the best results in the
min-entropy estimators [176]. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work that aims at extracting the best combination of
bits of the IPIs in terms of min-entropy.
• We empirically analyze more than 160,000 files and propose dif-
ferent combinations for extracting tokens by taking 2, 3, 4 and 5
bits which are, in general, much better than taking the 4 LSBs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides
some background on biometric authentication using an ECG signal
and also a necessary explanation of some random tests. Section 4.3
describes the evaluation of our implementations and a discussion of
the results. A description of the most relevant contributions in this
area is summarized in Section 4.4 while this paper ends with some
conclusions and future work in Section 4.5.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Dataset and IPI Extraction
Dataset We first downloaded 19 databases from the Physionet repos-
itory [57] which contain the heart information of several subjects/pa-
tients and their ECG signals in one or several channels. In these
datasets, we can find from healthy people as in cebsdb to patients
with myocardial diseases as in edb. Table 4.1 shows a summary of the
main characteristics of the 19 datasets used all throughout this work.
1https://physionet.org/physiobank/database/#ecg
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Database #Patients Pathology
afdb [55] 23 Atrial fibrillation
afpdb [119] 300 Paroxysmal atrial fibrillation
cebsdb [54] 60 Healthy volunteers
edb [170] 90 Myocardial and hypertension
fantasia [80] 40 Healthy
iafdb [139] 32 Atrial fibrillation or flutter
incartdb [140] 75 Coronary artery disease
ltafdb [138] 84 Paroxysmal
mitdb [120] 48 Arrhythmia
nsrdb [141] 18 No significant arrhythmias
nstdb [122] 15 Mitdb with noise
prcp [69] 10 Healthy
qtdb [96] 105 Holter recordings
sddb [61] 22 Arrhythmia
shareedb [116] 139 Hypertension
slpdb [74] 18 Sleep apnea syndrome
svdb [63] 70 Partial epilepsy
twadb [123] 100 Myocardial problems
vfdb [62] 22 Tachycardia
Table 4.1: For each database the number of patients and the pathol-
ogy (if any) of the patients involved.
Inter-Pulse Interval (IPI) extraction The time distance between
R-peaks (heartbeats) is one of the essential features for cryptography
that the ECG has. This time is usually known as Inter-Pulse Interval
(IPI), and it is particularly interesting because most of the proposed
works in this area found out that the four LSBs of each IPI have some
entropy [195, 147]. There are, on the contrary, some authors who use
more bits than the four LSBs [143, 137]. Contrarily what it is usually
assumed, in this work we empirically demonstrate that taking more
than 4 bits might be a good strategy from the entropy point of view
and we give the better combination of bits to generate a high entropic
sequence based on IPI values (see Section 4.3) than the usual 4 LSBs.
To process and extract the IPIs from the Physionet repository, we used
some scripts provided by them2. These scripts were used to obtain the
ECG signal from each patient of the 19 databases. After that, we run
the well-known Pan-Tomkins’s algorithm [132] over the ECG signal
to extract the R-peaks. Once we extracted the time intervals, we
calculated the difference between each pair of consecutive R-peaks to
2https://physionet.org/physiotools/software-index.shtml
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obtain the so-called IPI values.
Once we computed the IPIs, we run the quantization algorithm pro-
posed by Rostami et al. [147], which is a slight variation of the quan-
tization algorithm first proposed by Bao et al. [18] and later improved
by Xu et al. [195]. This algorithm fundamentally transforms a con-
tinuous signal into a discrete one and applies a Grey code to decrease
the errors of the signal.
We took the public source code recently released by Ortiz et al. [131]
and made some slight modifications to get all the IPIs. This task was
particularly computational demanding due to the amount of IPIs to
generate and the number of databases involved in the experiment.
4.2.2 Entropy & NIST
The concept of entropy was first introduced in 1948 by Shannon in
[164]. Roughly speaking, when applied to information theory, entropy
measures how probable an event may occur given all possible events,
that is, if the frequency of an event is so high, then the informa-
tion entropy is low. On the contrary, if an event only occurs some
times, it is said that it contains more information, and thus, the in-
formation entropy is high. More formally, the entropy is defined as
the negative logarithm of the probability mass function for the value:
H(X) = −∑ni PilogPi. This measurement of information entropy has
been widely used in the literature to verify, in our case, how good or
bad a heart signal is from the entropy point of view. In other words,
if a heart signal can be used as a source data generator due to its
entropy, i.e., if the heart can generate numbers with high entropy, it
means that such a signal might be used to generate random numbers.
However, by using just the Shannon entropy to claim that a source can
be considered random or not is not enough. Let us propose the follow-
ing sequence of bits “10101010". If someone calculates the Shannon
entropy, which is H(X) = 1 and does not perform any other entropy
tests, she might reach to the wrong conclusion that such a sequence is
highly entropic. However, it is quite clear that such a sequence follows
a pattern and thus, is far from being a random sequence (see Table 4.3
to see the complete example).
In 2012, the NIST STS published a draft with some recommendations
for the entropy sources used for random bit generation [19]. The final
document (NIST SP 800-90B) was recently published—early 2018—
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and can be seen in [176]. This document introduces the minimum
properties that an entropy source must have to make it suitable for use
by cryptographic random bit generators, as well as the min-entropy
which represents the minimum value after executing a set of tests
(estimators) used to validate the quality of the entropy source. Note
that the min-entropy value is never higher than the Shannon entropy.
It is important to remark the difference between the NIST STS min-
entropy and the one used in information theory which is a specific case
of Rényi’s entropy. In the former, uncertainty is measured in terms
of a random variable’s vulnerability to being guessed in one try by an
adversary [150]. This last concept has been recently used by Chizari
and Lupu [38] to measure the entropy of the heart signal.
Regarding the size of the dataset, the NIST STS SP 800-90B rec-
ommendation suggests that there is a minimum number of bits that
should be used to test the data source. Concretely, authors indicate
that “a sequential dataset of at least 1,000,000 consecutive sample val-
ues obtained directly from the noise source” is needed. Nevertheless,
if this constraint cannot be satisfied, they also contemplate the option
of taking small pieces of, at least 1,000 samples to create a dataset of
1,000,000 values if all these chunks come from the same data source
to be evaluated.
In Table 4.2, we can find a summary of the size of the databases. In
that table, we can split databases up into two main groups: 1) databases
that achieve more than 106 bits in the generated files, and; 2) databases
that do not achieve such threshold.Having that in mind, results regard-
ing databases that do not achieve such a threshold should be taken
with a pinch of salt. Despite that, we decided to keep them in the
analysis due because many works consider them (e.g., mitdb or qtdb)
in their experiments [147, 143, 124, 196].
In our work we are using the min-entropy estimators proposed by
the NIST STS to check if the bit sequences extracted from the heart
signal, pass such estimators or not and thus we can consider the heart
as entropy data source. The execution of each one of these estimators
gives as a result an entropy value which is independent from the others
estimators. Finally, the algorithm outputs the minimum value of all
the estimators, i.e., min-entropy.
In the following, we describe in more detail the ten proposed estimators
to compute the min-entropy by the NIST STS.
The Most Common Value Estimate This test first finds the pro-
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Database 2 bits 3 bits 4 bits 5 bits
afdb 3 3 3 3
afpdb 7 3 3 3
cebsdb 7 7 7 7
edb 3 3 3 3
fantasia 3 3 3 3
iafdb 7 7 7 7
incartdb 7 7 7 7
ltafdb 3 3 3 3
mitdb 7 7 7 7
nsrdb 3 3 3 3
nstdb 7 7 7 7
prcp 7 7 7 7
sddb 3 3 3 3
shareedb 3 3 3 3
slpdb 7 3 3 3
svdb 7 7 7 7
twadb 7 7 7 7
vfdb 7 7 7 7
Table 4.2: For each database, 7 the denotes whether the size of the
generated IPIs is less than 106, and; 3 means that the size is larger
than 106.
.
portion p of the most common value in the dataset, and then
constructs a confidence interval for such p.
The Collision Estimate This test is based on [65], and the goal is
to estimate the probability of the most-likely output value, based
on the collision times—the number of repeated values. This test
outputs a low entropy estimate for sources that have a significant
bias toward a particular output or value (i.e., the average time
to a collision is relatively short) while a higher entropy estimate
occurs for a longer average time to collision.
The Markov Estimate This method generates a min-entropy esti-
mate by measuring the dependencies between consecutive values
from the dataset. This test is used to test sources with depen-
dencies in the dataset.
The Compression Estimate This test computes the entropy rate
of a dataset based on how much the dataset can be compressed.
This test is based on the Maurer Universal Statistic [114], and
it is computed by generating a dictionary of values, and then
computing the average number of samples required to produce
an output, based on that dictionary.
The MultiMCW Prediction Estimate This test is composed of
multiple Most Common in Window (MCW) sub-predictors, each
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of which aims to guess the next output, based on the last n
outputs. This is done by each sub-predictor, which extracts the
most often value in that window of n outputs. This test was
designed for cases where the most common value changes over
time but remains relatively stationary over reasonable lengths of
the dataset.
The Lag Prediction Estimate Similar to the MCW, this test has
several sub-predictors, each of which predicts the next output
based on a so-called lag. This method keeps a counter of the
number of times that each sub-predictor was correct and uses
the best sub-predictor to predict the next value.
The MultiMMC Prediction Estimate The MultiMMC predictor
is composed of multiple Markov Model with Counting (MMC)
sub-predictors. Instead of keeping the probability of a transi-
tion like in a Markov model, the predictors of this test record
the observed frequencies for transitions from one output to a
subsequent output and makes a prediction based on the most
frequently observed transition from the current output.
The LZ78Y Prediction Estimate The LZ78Y predictor is loosely
based on LZ78 encoding with the Bernstein’s Yabba scheme [153]
for adding strings to the dictionary. The predictor keeps a dic-
tionary of strings that have been added to the dictionary so far
and continues adding new strings to the dictionary until the dic-
tionary has reached its maximum capacity.
The t-Tuple Estimate This method checks the frequency of t-Tuples,
i.e., pairs, triples, etc., that appears in the dataset. It produces
an estimate of the entropy per sample based on the frequency of
those t-tuples.
The LRS Estimate This test estimates the collision entropy (sam-
pling without replacement) of the dataset based on the number
of repeated tuples within the input dataset.
We carried out one experiment to help readability and understanding
of both, the min-entropy estimators, as well as the results presented
throughout this article. We generated: 1) a file of 106 bits length
repeatedly composed of the string “10"; 2) a file made of the first
106 of pi, and; 3) a file created of 106 bits after running the urand
function. The results can be seen in Table 4.3. As a final output, the
min-entropy represents the minimum value of all the above estimators,
i.e., 0.0, 0.56 and 0.84 respectively, which confirms that only the urand
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Estimator len(“10")=106 pi urand
Most_common 0.99 0.8 1.0
Collision 1.0 0.56 0.93
Markov 0.007 0.72 0.99
Maurer_universal 0.0 0.60 0.84
MultiMCW 0.0 0.81 0.99
Lag 0.0 0.81 0.98
MultiMMC 0.0 0.81 0.99
LZ78Y 0.0 0.81 0.99
t_tuple 0.0 0.70 0.91
LRS 0.0 0.93 0.99
Table 4.3: Example of min-entropy results using: a 106 bits file
composed of the sequence “10" (len(“10")=106); the first 106 bits of pi,
and; the first 106 bits of the output of the urand function.
seems a good source of entropy.
4.3 Entropy Evaluation of IPIs
In this section, we describe the experiments we carried out to analyze
in-depth the entropy quality of IPI values derived from an ECG signal.
That is, we show whether IPIs are a good source of randomness. We
explain below, in general terms, the methodology used for the analysis
of the nineteen datasets.
For all the experiments shown all along this section, we used the same
procedure. We first applied the quantization algorithm3 to extract the
IPIs. After that, we generated the variations without repetition of 2,
3, 4 and 5 bits, i.e., we produced Vk(n) = n!(n−k)! files where n is the
length of the IPIs—8 bits, and k is the number of bits. We, therefore,
generate 56, 336, 1680 and 6720 files respectively per database.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of an IPI and the notation we use to refer
to how a file is made of. In that Figure as well as for the rest of the
paper, the 1st bit (IPI1) is the Most Significant Bit (MSB) whereas the
last one (IPI8) is the Least Significant Bit (LSB). For example, when
we say “bits 268”, “a combination of bits 268”, or just “268”, we refer
that a file is generated by a concatenation of bits placed in the 2nd,
3See [147, 131] for more details about the quantization algorithm as well as for the source code.
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IPI
<latexit sha1_base64="COxOY29fb6nFLm/UaCNZYePt/lc="></latexit>
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
IPI1
<latexit sha1_base64="M9gXtpkEqGCxQ6OA74RdSZTfsZo="></latexit>
IPI3
<latexit sha1_base64="PhTiyI8/70qxbH1HK2ZHq+h5Qw8="></latexit>
IPI2
<latexit sha1_base64="M8Eda+aS7zwnialeYL1EowxqmPk="></latexit>
IPI4
<latexit sha1_base64="tjqRDFuZKuD7bzMzbM717Y1dJJc="></latexit>
IPI5
<latexit sha1_base64="qV60IjsJoX215kBGgGRQc5bHn2A="></latexit>
IPI6
<latexit sha1_base64="MvWyOWASbaMWx2aaq+syd9KV3PY="></latexit>
IPI7
<latexit sha1_base64="0GEqyJQuZiqEw2wRLOL1vEM6EXY="></latexit>
IPI8
<latexit sha1_base64="Ufg8miwKWfz6yOLTta3THVjCGrA="></latexit>
Figure 4.1: Position of bits in IPIs.
6th and 8th positions of the IPIs (i.e., IPI2||IPI6||IPI8) belonging to a
concrete database, e.g., “000” in the example of Figure 4.1. Another
example might be the combination of bits 78 (i.e., IPI7||IPI8), which
can also be read as the file made of the last 2 LSB of IPIs, e.g., “10”
in the example of Figure 4.1.
After running the min-entropy (using ten estimators) in our previous
example against three well-known examples (see Table 4.3), we assume
and without loss of generality, that an estimator is successful when
the entropy is higher than 0.7. Note that we impose this threshold
and depending on the security application, it might be more or less
restrictive. In Section 4.3.5, we show the results we would have got
by using a threshold of 0.9 which is the threshold we have observed in
many scientific papers for a sequence to be considered entropic or not
[8, 159, 143, 124, 206].
We followed the same methodology for carrying out all the experiments
as well as for analyzing the results after running the min-entropy es-
timators provided by the NIST STS SP 800-90B recommendation.
First, we obtained the maximum number of estimators (e.g., Collision
and Markov estimators are higher than the specified threshold) that a
combination of bits may achieve, i.e., for each database, we computed
all the variations without repetitions and selected the best combina-
tion(s) that passes the maximum number of min-entropy estimators.
Second, and using the thresholds computed previously (maximum
number of passed estimators), we grouped all the databases, and for
each combination of bits, we counted the number of databases that
achieves these thresholds. All this information is displayed in a figure
in which each column represents a histogram. With this experiment,
we can: 1) corroborate one of the main differences between the min-
entropy estimators and the classical Shannon entropy: e.g., the order
in which the entropy source generates the random sequence matters;
2) obtain a detailed list of the best and most common combination
of bits to be chosen for different length of the IPIs, and; 3) compare
the results we got with the combination that it is usually used in the
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IPI-based papers.
It is remarkable that, given the high demanding operations, we had
to implement a few strategies to speed up and to improve the per-
formance of the experiments. In particular we: i) executed the es-
timators sequentially (following the same order we introduced them
in Section 4.2.2) until we found an estimator that failed it and we
stopped the execution, and; ii) we introduced a slight modification to
the min-entropy python project provided by the NIST STS in such a
way that we only take the first 106 characters from the generated files.
This patch allowed us to speed up considerably the last two estimators
which are the most computationally demanding (i.e., t-Tuple and LRS
estimators). According to our estimations, if we would not have done
that, executing all the min-entropy estimators to all the 19 to all the
variations without repetition for 8 elements taking from 2, 3, 4 and
5 bits would have taken us more than one year of computing these
results in a Linux based cluster with 16 CPUs and 40Gb of RAM.
Besides, we carried out another experiment to see the differences be-
tween the Shannon entropy versus the min-entropy tests. The goal
of this experiment is to demonstrate that, only by using the Shannon
entropy is not enough to claim that a source can be entropic or not.
In particular, for this test, we took the minimum value after running
all the estimators (as suggested by NIST) as the min-entropy, and
we additionally computed the Shannon entropy for all the variations
without repetition for each one of the databases. We repeated this
experiment for bits length from 2 to 5.
Finally, we generated heatmaps to see the number of failed estima-
tors per database. These results will shed some light on the weak-
nesses of the bit streams generated. It is essential to remark two main
things: 1. the heatmaps do not show the combinations of databases
that passed all the estimators, and; 2. estimators are executed sequen-
tially, and that is why in the heatmaps there are estimators with no
numbers.
4.3.1 V2(8) Variations of two bits without repeti-
tion
We analyzed the results after running the min-entropy estimators for
variations without repetition of 2 bits and the results are shown in
Figures 4.2 and 4.3. In average, it can be seen how in most of the
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databases, the maximum number of successful tests (estimator higher
than 0.7) is four (see Figure 4.2a). In the case of both fantasia and
twadb there is at least a combination of bits that passes five estima-
tors of the min-entropy test while in the case of nstdb, prcp, sddb and
shareedb there is at least one combination that passes three estima-
tors at the same time. Finally, cebsdb is the only one where at least
one combination passes all the estimators at a time. In particular,
this combination is the one composed of the two LSBs in the inverse
order, i.e., 87. It is noticeable that this combination is represented in
Figure 4.2b.
In addition to that, from such a plot, we conclude that any of the
permutations of the last 2 LSBs are the best one to be chosen if only
2 bits are picked as entropy source (i.e., in 11 out of 19) have such
combinations as the best ones) followed by the permutation of the bits
8 and 6 (common in 10 out of 19).
We also tried to find some correlation between the composition of the
databases without success. For instance, the set of healthy databases
is composed of {cebsdb, fantasia, nsrdb, prcp} and the combination
of bits 78 is not considered to be the best option in any of them. On
the contrary, the combination of bits 87 is the best one only in the
cebsdb database.
We created a boxplot in Figure 4.3a to show a comparison of using the
Shannon entropy versus the min-entropy. From such a plot, it is quite
clear to see the difference between these tests. Therefore, and under
the NIST STS SP 800-90B recommendation, there are no databases
which might be considered suitable as a good source of randomness
from the entropy point of view.
Finally, Figure 4.3b depicts the estimators where databases fail with
most frequency. It is interesting to see that there is only one record in
the cebsdb database that passes all the estimators at a time (note that
the sum of all the numbers in the cebsdb row gives 55 and the V2(8) =
56). Particular attention should be put in both prcp and sddb, where
a majority of the records fail in the first estimator (most_common)
which indicates that the sequences of bits are clearly not balanced, i.e.,
there are more 1’s than 0’s or the other way around. In general, most
of the databases stop their execution after running the MultiMCW
estimator which means that, despite the number of symbols (1’s and
0’s) vary over the sequence, that difference is in fact not that much
and thus it is relatively easy to predict.
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Figure 4.2: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 2 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.2a represents the maximum number of passed
estimators that achieves at least one combination of bits. Figure 4.2b
shows the best and most common combination of bits of databases.
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most_common
collision
markov
maurer_universal
MultiMCW Lag
MultiMMC
LZ78Y
t_tuple
LRS
vfdb  
twadb  
svdb  
slpdb  
shareedb  
sddb  
qtdb  
prcp  
nstdb  
nsrdb  
mitdb  
ltafdb  
incartdb  
iafdb  
fantasia  
edb  
cebsdb  
afpdb  
afdb  
14 12 0 18 12 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
6 6 0 13 21 10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 17 0 21 4 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 8 0 24 10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 28 0 14 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
38 4 4 10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 14 0 19 9 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
40 2 8 6 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 4 0 6 32 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 29 0 13 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 4 0 8 30 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 12 0 16 14 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 15 0 13 14 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 15 0 1 20 0 0 0 6 -10
18 4 2 4 22 6 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 15 0 23 4 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 0 0 4 12 2 0 0 17 6
14 27 0 11 4 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
14 19 2 16 5 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
(b) Failed estimators.
Figure 4.3: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 2 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.3a depicts a comparison of the min-entropy and
the Shannon entropy. Figure 4.3b shows a heatmap of the most failed
estimators per database.
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4.3.2 V3(8) Variations of three bits without repe-
tition
We generated the V3(8) and obtained 336 files per database. After
that, we executed the min-entropy estimators to each one of the files
to obtain the maximum number of passed estimators. The results can
be seen in Figure 4.4a. In particular, we can assort the results for
this experiment into two groups of databases: 1) a first group with
databases that passed 5 estimators (fantasia, iafdb, nstdb and twadb),
and; 2) a group with databases that passed 4 estimators (afdb, afpdb,
cebsdb, edb, incartdb, ltafdb, mitdb, nsrdb, prcp, qtdb, sddb, sha-
reedb, slpdb, svdb and vfdb). Contrarily to the first experiment, now
databases seem to converge between four and five passed estimators at
the most. However, we cannot extract any conclusion about the na-
ture of the databases, i.e., healthy databases and people with diseases
are mixed indistinguishably.
Figure 4.4b shows, a clear tendency: the 2nd MSB appears in all the
combination of bits which achieve the best results: {268, 286, 628, 682,
826, 862, 278, 287, 728, 782, 827, 872}, but: {638, 836}. Additionally, if
we take into account the size constraint suggested by NIST STS rec-
ommendation (see Table 4.2), we can claim that the best combinations
of bits for V3(8) are given by the permutation of the positions 2, 6 and
8, i.e., P3{2, 6, 8} = {268, 286, 628, 682, 826, 862}, the permutation
of the positions 2, 7 and 8, i.e., P3{2, 7, 8} and the combinations 638
and 836. These results are clearly in contradiction to what many re-
searchers claimed about which are the best bits to choose, i.e., the
composition of the LSBs, which in this case would have been the com-
bination of bits 678.
We conducted one more experiment to check how many databases have
the combination of bits 678 as the best one. We obtained that afdb,
afpdb, cebsdb, edb, fantasia, incartdb, ltafdb, mitdb, qtdb, shareedb,
slpdb, svdb, twadb, vfdb databases have it (14 out of 19). However,
the set mentioned before: {P3{2, 6, 8}}⋃{P3{2, 7, 8}}⋃{638, 836}, apart
from the aforementioned databases, they also have in common nstdb
and nsrdb databases (16 out of 19).
It can be seen in Figure 4.5a a comparison between values obtained
from running the Shannon entropy and the min-entropy estimators
for all the generated V3(8) variations and grouped per databases. In
this plot, it can be observed how, just by calculating the Shannon
89
4. Are IPIs of an ECG Signal a Good Source of Entropy?
af
db
af
pd
b
ce
bs
db ed
b
fa
nt
as
ia
ia
fd
b
in
ca
rt
db
lt
af
db
m
it
db
ns
rd
b
ns
td
b
pr
cp
qt
db
sd
db
sh
ar
ee
db
sl
pd
b
sv
db
tw
ad
b
vf
db
0
1
2
3
4
5
M
ax
 n
um
be
r 
of
 p
as
se
d 
es
ti
m
at
or
s
!!"#"!$%!$&''
()*+,-%!%./%!0+1/2"""34/54"6-7186"98:;</,=4">?@A?B":8<7+,-=85+-1C+6+"DC7+=4C<84=C:8<<8,EF=<1
26
8
28
6
62
8
63
8
68
2
82
6
83
6
86
2
27
8
28
7
72
8
78
2
82
7
87
2
36
8
38
6
68
3
86
3
25
8
28
5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
4 passed estimators 5 passed estimators
Combination of bits
# 
D
at
ab
as
es
(a) Number of passed estimators
!!"#"!$%!$&''
()*+,-%!%./%!0+1/2"""34/54"6-7186"98:;</,=4">?@A?B":8<7+,-=85+-1C+6+"DC7+=4C<84=C:8<<8,EF=<1
26
8
28
6
62
8
63
8
68
2
82
6
83
6
86
2
27
8
28
7
72
8
78
2
82
7
87
2
36
8
38
6
68
3
86
3
25
8
28
5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
4 passed estimators 5 passed estimators
Combination of bits
# 
D
at
ab
as
es
!!"#"!$%!$&!'
()*+,-%!%./%!0+1/2"""34/54"6-7186"98:;</,=4">?@A?B":8<7+,-=85+-1C+6+"DC7+=4C<84=C:8<<8,EF=<1
23
75
8
23
85
7
26
38
7
27
35
8
27
36
8
27
53
8
27
58
3
27
83
6
28
35
7
28
53
7
32
75
8
32
85
7
35
72
8
35
82
7
36
27
8
36
28
7
36
82
7
37
26
8
37
28
6
37
82
6
0
5
10
15
20 8 passed estimators 4 passed estimators 5 passed estimators
# 
D
at
ab
as
es
!!"#"!$%!&'()
*+,-./%!%01%!2-314"""56176"8/93:8";:<=>1.?6"@ABCAD"<:>9-./?:7-/3E-8-"(E9-?6E>:6?E<:>>:.FG?>3
78 87 68 86 28 37 73 58 85 27 82 34 72 38 83 43 57 67 75 76
0
2
4
6
8
10
10 passed estimators 3 passed estimators 4 passed estimators 5 passed estimators
Combination of bits
# 
D
at
ab
as
es
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Figure 4.4: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 3 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.4a represents the maximum number of passed
estimators that achieves at least one combination of bits. Figure 4.4b
shows the best and most common combination of bits of databases.
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most_common collision markov maurer_universal MultiMCW Lag MultiMMC LZ78Y t_tuple LRS
vfdb  
twadb  
svdb  
slpdb  
shareedb  
sddb  
qtdb  
prcp  
nstdb  
nsrdb  
mitdb  
ltafdb  
incartdb  
iafdb  
fantasia  
edb  
cebsdb  
afpdb  
afdb  
90 0 0 27 219 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 0 0 0 215 121 -10 -10 -10 -10
96 0 0 35 205 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
126 0 0 25 185 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
126 0 0 96 114 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
240 0 11 49 36 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
90 0 0 0 246 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
222 0 40 2 72 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
72 0 0 11 229 24 -10 -10 -10 -10
126 0 0 120 90 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
108 0 0 0 228 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
126 0 0 24 186 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
90 0 0 24 222 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
78 0 0 1 256 1 -10 -10 -10 -10
96 30 0 12 30 168 -10 -10 -10 -10
120 0 0 54 162 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
126 0 0 0 210 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
72 0 0 29 235 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
114 7 0 90 125 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
(b) Failed estimators
Figure 4.5: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 3 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.5a depicts a comparison of the min-entropy and
the Shannon entropy. Figure 4.5b shows a heatmap of the most failed
estimators per database.
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entropy, cannot be claimed that the heart signal can be considered a
good source of entropy. The results are far from being acceptable, and
this leads us to compute one final plot regarding which estimators are
the worst ones, i.e., a statistical analysis of which estimators that the
bit streams generated failed the most are.
In Figure 4.5b we can see that in general, most of the databases fail
in the MultiMCW. Besides, the files of fantasia database usually fail
in the Lag estimator—which is an extended and improved version
of the MultiMCW estimator. It is also worth mentioning that prcp
and sddb databases fail in the first estimator, i.e., Most_common.
This estimator predicts the next output based on previous knowledge.
Thus, we can claim that both prcp and sddb are not good choices
when using 3 bits. Finally, it is interesting to see that none of the
databases managed to execute the last four estimators because they
failed in previous ones.
4.3.3 V4(8) Variations of four bits without repeti-
tion
For this experiment, we generated the 1680 possible variations without
repetition corresponding to how many different ways four items from
eight elements can be chosen. We passed the min-entropy estimators
to all the 1680 * 19 files, and the results can be seen in Figures 4.6
and 4.7.
It is interesting to see that the results are quite similar to the obtained
in the previous experiment (i.e., V3(8)). In detail, the number of es-
timators that are successfully passed in each database is exactly the
same with some exceptions. Prpc database passes one more estimator
and, in fantasia database, at least, a combination of bits passes all
the estimators at a time. In relation to Figure 4.6b, the set of com-
binations of bits that passes more tests are the following ones: {2638,
2834, 3628, 3826, 4283, 6283, 6382, 8263, 8342, 8362}.
In this case, it is remarkable that none of the databases of the group
that passes five estimators (i.e., {iafdb, nstdb, prcp, twadb}), achieves
the minimum requirement in terms of size that the NIST STS recom-
mendation establishes (see Table 4.2). Despite that, and given the fact
that we found some works in the literature which directly or indirectly
use some of these databases for security purposes [97, 194], we decided
to keep them in the interpretation of the results.
92
4. Are IPIs of an ECG Signal a Good Source of Entropy?
af
db
af
pd
b
ce
bs
db ed
b
fa
nt
as
ia
ia
fd
b
in
ca
rt
db
lt
af
db
m
it
db
ns
rd
b
ns
td
b
pr
cp
qt
db
sd
db
sh
ar
ee
db
sl
pd
b
sv
db
tw
ad
b
vf
db
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
ax
 n
um
be
r 
of
 p
as
se
d 
es
ti
m
at
or
s
!!"#"!$%!$&'!
()*+,-%!%./%!0+1/2"""34/54"6-7186"98:;</,=4">?@A?B":8<7+,-=85+-1C+6+"'C7+=4C<84=C:8<<8,DE=<1
26
38
28
34
36
28
38
26
42
83
62
83
63
82
82
63
83
42
83
62
24
38
26
37
27
36
28
36
28
37
34
28
38
24
38
27
82
43
82
73
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
10 passed estimators 4 passed estimators 5 passed estimators
Combination of bits
# 
D
at
ab
as
es
(a) Number of passed estimators
!!"#"!$%!$&''
()*+,-%!%./%!0+1/2"""34/54"6-7186"98:;</,=4">?@A?B":8<7+,-=85+-1C+6+"DC7+=4C<84=C:8<<8,EF=<1
26
38
28
34
36
28
38
26
42
83
62
83
63
82
82
63
83
42
83
62
24
38
26
37
27
36
28
36
28
37
34
28
38
24
38
27
82
43
82
73
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
4 passed estimators 5 passed estimators
# 
D
at
ab
as
es
!!"#"!$%!$&'(
)*+,-.%!%/0%!1,203"""45065"7.8297":9;<=0->5"?@AB@C";9=8,-.>96,.2D,7,"(D8,>5D=95>D;9==9-EF>=2
23
75
8
23
85
7
26
38
7
27
35
8
27
36
8
27
53
8
27
58
3
27
83
6
28
35
7
28
53
7
32
75
8
32
85
7
35
72
8
35
82
7
36
27
8
36
28
7
36
82
7
37
26
8
37
28
6
37
82
6
0
5
10
15
20 8 passed estimators 4 passed estimators 5 passed estimators
Combination of bits
# 
D
at
ab
as
es
(b) Best combinations.
Figure 4.6: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 4 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.6a represents the maximum number of passed
estimators that achieves at least one combination of bits. Figure 4.6b
shows the best and most common combination of bits of databases.
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vfdb  
twadb  
svdb  
slpdb  
shareedb  
sddb  
qtdb  
prcp  
nstdb  
nsrdb  
mitdb  
ltafdb  
incartdb  
iafdb  
fantasia  
edb  
cebsdb  
afpdb  
afdb  
408 308 0 0 964 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 59 0 0 653 968 -10 -10 -10 -10
240 628 0 0 812 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
600 175 0 0 905 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
542 642 0 0 496 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
1296 76 11 16 281 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
48 345 0 0 1287 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
1032 346 106 2 170 24 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 266 0 0 996 418 -10 -10 -10 -10
840 369 0 0 471 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
288 56 0 0 1336 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
700 143 0 0 837 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
240 487 0 0 953 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
72 293 0 0 1069 246 -10 -10 -10 -10
504 116 6 5 128 755 34 1 109 -10
24 611 0 0 1045 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 33 0 0 1647 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 910 0 0 770 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
552 495 0 6 627 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
(b) Failed estimators
Figure 4.7: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 4 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.7a depicts a comparison of the min-entropy and
the Shannon entropy. Figure 4.7b shows a heatmap of the most failed
estimators per database.
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Figure 4.6b depicts the best and most common combination of bits
for V4(8). One thing that drew our attention regarding such a plot
is that the 3rd bit appears in all the top 20 of the most common
combinations whereas the 5th MSB (or the 4th LSB) is not in any of
them. Remember that for four bits, the combination that has usually
been taken in the literature is 5678 [147].
We conducted the same verification as in the previous experiments
to certify where the combination of bits used by the majority of the
IPI-based papers is. We got that such a combination is considered to
be the best one in cebsdb, edb, mitdb, qtdb, shareedb, slpdb, svdb,
twadb, vfdb, i.e., (9 out of 19). To compare the improvement we
achieved by using any of the set of the best combination we generated,
i.e., {2638, 2834, 3628, 3826, 4283, 6283, 6382, 8263, 8342, 8362}, we
computed the databases that have any of the elements of such a set
which are: afdb, afpdb, cebsdb, edb, iafdb, incartdb, ltafdb, mitdb,
nsrdb, nstdb, qtdb, sddb, shareedb, slpdb, svdb, twadb, vfdb, i.e.,
the same databases that the combination of the last 4 LSBs (i.e.,
5678) plus 8 more databases (17 out of 19in total). With this, we can
conclude that the combination that is usually taken in the literature
is, by far, not the best one that can be chosen from the min-entropy
point of view according to the NIST STS recommendation.
In Figure 4.7a, we can see a comparison between the Shannon entropy
and the min-entropy tests when applied to all the V4(8) variations.
Similar to the rest of the performed experiments, we cannot say that
there is a significant improvement concerning the V3(8) experiment.
We can see how some databases improve their results like afpdb, fan-
tasia, ltafdb, shareedb or svdb, but the general improvement is not
breakthrough. Contrary to what can be claimed using the Shannon
entropy, from the min-entropy values we can conclude that the 4th
bits of the IPI values are not entropic (i.e., they are not a good source
of randomness).
Finally, Figure 4.7b shows the distribution of the most failed tests for
tokens generated taking four bits of the IPI. Once again, it is inter-
esting to see how the fantasia database obtains the best results of all
the experiments. Even though 109 combinations fail the t_tuple esti-
mator, it is the only database that achieves that estimator (remember
that estimators are executed sequentially and we stop when one of the
tests fails). About the rest of the databases, it can be seen how now
the databases fail the Collision instead of the Compression (Maurer
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Universal Statistic tests) estimators. Recall that the Collision esti-
mator mainly detects when the source is biased towards a particular
value, whereas the Compression estimator tries to compress the values
and generates the average number of samples needed to produce such
an output. Roughly speaking, it can be observed how by increasing
the number of bits per file, they can be more compressed, but they
are biased by either having more 0’s or 1’s values.
4.3.4 V5(8) Variations of five bits without repeti-
tion
The last variation that we computed is V5(8). In general, it can be seen
in Figure 4.8a how the maximum number of estimators that databases
got are almost the same than in V4(8). Nevertheless, in this case,
fantasia database passes only eight out of ten estimators at the most
(10 out of 10 in V4(8)). With all this, we can conclude that taking 5
bits does not directly affect the final min-entropy value.
This result is an improvement in terms of performance due to the
usual procedure to generate random tokens, i.e., appending some bits
to create bit streams of a given size. For instance, to create a token of
128 bits by appending the four LSBs, it would be needed—at least—
32 IPIs. On the contrary, if five bits were used, then—at least—27
IPIs would be required. Note that, if for example, a healthy subject
beats one time per second (60 bits per minute), we will be saving 5
seconds to generate the same key.
Regarding the best combination of bits (see Figure 4.8b), it can be seen
how they are an extension of the previous combinations in V4(8). For
example, in V4(8), the best combination is 2638 whereas for five bits,
the same combination plus the 2nd MSB forms one of the best options
(i.e., 26387). Another similar case can be seen for the combination of
36287 bits.
Also, note that the top 20 of best and most frequent combinations
are in common in 19 out of 19. These results, once again corroborate
the previous conclusion: it is better to use 5 bits instead of 4. This
fact means that for instance, the combination of bits 26387 is the
best one possible in any of the tested databases. Additionally and
for completeness, we looked for the usually assumed combination of
bits 45678 being best one in only 11 databases (afpdb, cebsdb, edb,
incartdb, ltafdb, mitdb, qtdb, shareedb, svdb, twadb, vfdb) which is
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far from any of the best combinations.
Figure 4.9a shows both Shannon and the min-entropy values. The
results follow the same pattern as in the previous experiments in the
sense that there is a considerable distance between them. However,
we can now see how the min-entropy values of the databases are less
spread than in any of the previous experiments. Once again, and
following the same line as in V3(8) and V4(8), we can see how fantasia
database achieves the best results in average (note that the median
is close to 0.6). In any case, in general, from the perspective of min-
entropy, the results are not good enough to consider the ECG signal
as a good source of entropy.
Finally, in Figure 4.9b, we can see that most of the databases fail in
the MultiMCW estimator (similar to V3(8) and V4(8) experiments).
Fantasia database achieves the best results of the tested databases
concluding then that fantasia database is the best one.
4.3.5 Limitations and Discussion
As mentioned at the beginning of this Section, we set up a threshold
of 0.7 to claim when a sequence of bits passes or not each one of the
estimators of the min-entropy. We are aware that this threshold might
be subjective. Unfortunately, even with this relaxed threshold, the
results are not as good as it is usually claimed in the literature so far.
In order to be more realistic, we can increase up that threshold to 0.9,
which is the number we have observed in many scientific papers [8, 159,
143, 124, 206] as well as the result we obtained after running the urand
function (see Table 4.3) and we summarize the results in Figure 4.10.
These plots show that results are worse—as it was expected—than
setting the threshold to 0.7 in terms of the maximum number of passed
estimators—note that ten is the ideal value.
Finally, in Table 4.4, we summarize the conclusions we got from all
the experiments executed. It is also interesting to mention that we
limited the representation of the results to the top 20. This has direct
repercussions in V5(8), both Figure 4.8b and Table 4.4 where only the
first 20 combinations are shown. However, more combinations are not
there and achieve the same results.
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Figure 4 8: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 5 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.8a represents the maximum number of passed
estimators that achieves at least one combination of bits. Figure 4.8b
shows the best and most common combination of bits of databases.
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most_common collision markov maurer_universal MultiMCW Lag MultiMMC LZ78Y t_tuple LRS
vfdb  
twadb  
svdb  
slpdb  
shareedb  
sddb  
qtdb  
prcp  
nstdb  
nsrdb  
mitdb  
ltafdb  
incartdb  
iafdb  
fantasia  
edb  
cebsdb  
afpdb  
afdb  
0 13 0 0 6707 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 0 0 0 1925 4795 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 354 0 0 6366 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
1560 31 0 0 5129 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
1920 286 4 0 4510 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
5520 3 119 0 1078 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 134 0 0 6586 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
4320 39 202 0 1623 536 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 269 0 0 3286 3165 -10 -10 -10 -10
1489 344 14 74 4799 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 0 0 0 6720 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
240 702 35 29 5714 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 129 0 24 6567 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 229 0 0 3770 2721 -10 -10 -10 -10
1800 203 0 2 298 3583 233 0 601 -10
0 3 0 0 6717 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 0 0 0 6720 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
0 222 0 0 6498 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
1560 366 0 26 4768 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
(b) Failed estimators
Figure 4.9: Entropy analysis of files generated by extracting 5 bits
from IPIs. Figure 4.9a depicts a comparison of the min-entropy and
the Shannon entropy. igure 4.9b shows a heatmap of the most failed
estimators per database.
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(a) 2 bits.
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(b) 3 bits.
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(c) 4 bits.
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Figure 4.10: Min-entropy comparison with thresholds equal to 0.7
and 0.9.
Variations Best Combinations Databases
V2(8) {P2{7, 8}} 11 out of 19
V3(8) {P3{2, 6, 8}}⋃{P3{2, 7, 8}}⋃{638, 836} 16 out of 19
V4(8)
{2638,2834,3628,3826,4283,6283,6382} ⋃
{8263,8342,8362} 17 out of 19
V5(8)
{23758,23857,26387,27358} ⋃
{27368,27538,27583,27836,28357,28537} ⋃
{32758,32857,35728,35827,36278,36287}⋃
{36827,37268,37286,37826}
19 out of 19
Table 4.4: Summary of the experiments (first column) carried out
together with the best combination of bits (second column) and the
number of common databases that have these combinations (last col-
umn).
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4.4 Related Work
Bao et al. [18], Poon et al. [144] and Bao et al. [17] proposed in 2004,
2006 and 2008 respectively, different protocols to secure BANs. In
these proposals, the authors claimed that the ECG signal, and in par-
ticular the Inter-Pulse Intervals (IPIs) value have entropy, and there-
fore, can be used for security purposes. In the following, we try to
summarize and classify the most relevant contributions as well as the
methodology authors used (if any) to check that the chosen bits have
entropy. More concretely, we only focus on those works which system-
atically pick the n Least Significant Bits (LSBs) of the IPIs. We leave
out of this summary those works where no info is given about how
long the sequence is [196, 198] or those which do not use the quantiza-
tion algorithm proposed by Rostami et al. [147] using wavelets instead
[88, 28].
In 2010, Venkatasubramanian and Gupta [186] proposed an IPI-based
protocol to secure communications between sensors in a BSN. This
protocol was based on Poon et al.’s work [144] and authors did not
corroborate the entropy of IPI values. A year later, in 2011 Xu et al.
[195] proposed IMDGuard, a security scheme for IMDs where the key
establishment is based on IPIs. In this paper, authors were the first
who introduced the quantization algorithm—a pre-processing signal
algorithm—and carried out an in-depth analysis of IPI randomness
by running a subset of NIST STS tests [20] and stated that the four
LSBs are random.
Based on previous works [195, 186, 144], in 2013, Rostami et al. [147]
carried out an experiment against ptbdb, mitdb and mghdb databases
and, after extracting the IPIs and running the quantization algorithm
they corroborated that the last 4 LSBs of the IPI are totally uncorre-
lated just by calculating the Shannon entropy. In the same year and
based on the same papers, Hu et al. proposed OPFKA [73], a secure
key establishment protocol. However, authors: 1) did not corrobo-
rate previous results, and; 2) did not mention which databases from
Physionet repository they used for their experiments.
Seepers et al. [159] proposed in 2015 a key generation procedure based
on IPIs. Regarding the entropy evaluation, authors analyzed the en-
tropy of the 4 LSBs obtained from the IPIs from 42 subjects from
mitdb and fantasia, and 111 subjects from BioSec4 database. They
4https://www.comm.utoronto.ca/~biometrics/databases.html
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claimed that the Shannon entropy was gradually decreasing when tak-
ing more significant bits. Another key generation protocol was pro-
posed a year later, in 2016, Altop et al. [8] based on IPIs. Authors
used to test their proposal 50 subjects from the MIMIC II Waveform
[151], and they calculated the Shannon entropy to check how entropic
the heart signals are. We want to highlight that none of the described
proposals checks different combinations of bits as we proposed in this
work.
Recently, Kim et al. [91] studied the peak misdetection issue and pro-
posed a recovery key exchange protocol. In their proposal, they used
the Physionet repository, but they did not specify which databases
they used and tested their solution by using a subset of NIST STS
and all the tests provided by AIS.31 [133].
Koya et al. [93] proposed a hybrid mutual authentication and key
agreement scheme for WBANs. Authors appended the four LSBs to
create a 128-bits token and tested their proposal against both ptbdb
and mitdb databases. Similarly to previous works, authors just cal-
culated the standard Shannon entropy to check and claim that the
generated tokens are random.
4.5 Conclusions
In this article, we scrutinized the IPI values from an ECG signal
as an entropy source generator. In detail, we analyzed and empir-
ically demonstrated that taking the Least Significant Bits (LSBs)
of the IPI values, as has been done so far in most contributions
[8, 91, 159, 161, 88], is not the best approach for randomness gen-
eration. Instead, we generated variations without repetition of eight
elements—corresponding to the position of the bits in an IPI—taken
from two, three, four and five bits respectively and generated thou-
sands of files that we then analyzed by using the min-entropy esti-
mators proposed by the NIST SP 800-90B. Note that the use of the
min-entropy is a more conservative approach, and this value will never
surpass the Shannon entropy. From this analysis, we offered other al-
ternative combinations for two (e.g., 87), three (e.g., 638), four (e.g.,
2638) and five (e.g., 23758) bits which are, in general, much better
than taking the four LSBs from the entropy point of view.
As future work, we plan to analyze the randomness quality of the files
generated with the best combinations of IPI bits obtained from our
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in-depth and rigorous analysis. As suggested by NIST SP 800-90B,
a conditioning component (e.g., to reduce bias and/or increase the
entropy rate) may be necessary to improve the randomness quality of
the final output.
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Conclusions
This Thesis analyzes the security and privacy issues in services based
on biosignals for implantable medical and wearable devices. In the
following, the main conclusions and future work.
5.1 Summary and Conclusions
In Chapter 1 it is shown a summary of the main concepts that this
Thesis is based on, i.e., basic concepts of biometrics; the use of heart
signals as a biosignal for biometrics; how ECG signal is processed and
handled, and; where the data come from to test different proposals.
In the final part of this Chapter, the objectives that this dissertation
tackles, namely O1, O2, O3 and O4, are introduced as well as the
main motivation for this PhD.
In Chapter 2, we executed two of the most representative randomness
suites, i.e., ENT and NIST STS, to the generated IPI values (random
number generated by heart signals) of 19 databases downloaded from
the Physionet public repository. The analyzed results lead to the
following conclusions:
1. IPI values are not as random as were supposed to be.
2. The database that achieves better results is cebsdb, composed of
users who do not suffer any medical condition, instead of mitdb
which is the most common database used in the literature.
3. A short burst of bits derived from a heart record may seem
random, but when large files derived from the heart signal are
analyzed, they show that heart signal should not be used for
security purposes by using the Rostami et al. methodology [147].
4. An in depth analysis of the random number generation by using
heart signals was covered in Chapter 2, addressing thus the first
objective (O1).
In Chapter 3, we applied an IPI-based token generation approach to
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obtain equal tokens from the same cardiac signal measured at the same
time in two different parts of the body. To get both tokens, it was
necessary to process the signals by using a fuzzy extractor algorithm
and a time automata algorithm. In total, nineteen databases of the
Physionet public repository were used to this experiment. We filtered
out and selected those databases with at least two cardiac signals taken
from different sensors. Regarding this work, the next conclusions are
stated:
1. A pre-processing of the heart signal is mandatory for generating
the same token. Using error corrections algorithms or do not
solve the synchronization of the signals alone. Because of that,
we proposed a run-time monitor, based on a timed automaton,
to synchronize both ECG signals.
2. In our experiments, by using both time automata and fuzzy ex-
tractors algorithms together, errors are reduced to zero in many
of the tested databases.
3. The time needed to generate 32, 64 and 128 bit tokens is in-
creased by 12 to 56 seconds on average to obtain the tokens
due to the pre-processing step to synchronize both signals, con-
trarily to what it is usually assumed (6, 12, and 24 seconds for
individual with a heart rate of 80 bpm).
4. A new system to generate cryptographics keys coming from dif-
ferent sensors measuring the same heart signal has been proposed
in Chapter 3, addressing thus the second and the third objectives
(O2, O3) of this dissertation.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we carried out an in-depth study, analyzing
the entropy of the heart signal. In particular, we evaluated the IPI
values extracted from a heart signal according to the NIST STS rec-
ommendation. This is the first work that aims at extracting the best
combination of bits of the IPIs in terms of min-entropy. The results
obtained from this work can be summarized as:
1. We demonstrated that the four LSBs are not the best bits to be
used in cryptographic applications.
2. We empirically analyzed more than 160,000 files and proposed
different combinations for generating tokens of 2, 3, 4 and 5 bits
length which are, in general, much better than taking the LSBs.
3. We analyzed the entropy of the LSBs values extracted from a
heart signal addressing thus the fourth objective (O4) of this
dissertation.
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As a global conclusion, one of the difficulties encountered was that
many of the previous proposals in this field did not provide enough
information about either the databases authors used for testing or
if the dataset is private, or even the methodology used to generated
the IPIs. Therefore, in order to advance in this line of research, it
would be a good starting point to either use public repositories such
as Physionet or make the datasets public.
5.2 Future Work
There are two main decisions we took which might be improved in the
future.
Extend to other biometrical signals. We have focused on heart signals
by using two channels (ECG1 and ECG2). We plan to extend
our analysis and proposal to other physiological signals like Pho-
toplethysmograms (PPGs), Blood Pressure (BP) or even using
the Electroencephalograms (EEGs), as proposed in [13].
Timed Automaton. The mean value has been used as the upper-bound
time for RR intervals as it has been previously proposed in me-
dial research [175], and the consequence is that certain peaks
are missed and the run-time monitor does not synchronize as
many peaks as it might do. We plan to further research on this
line and refine our timed automaton to achieve better results,
specially in those databases that do not perform as well.
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